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This dissertation studies monetary policy in emerging market economies and ad-
dresses three important questions from both a normative and positive perspective.
Chapter 1 studies how central banks should react when capital flows are
volatile. The analytical framework is a Markov-switching dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model that features time-varying external volatility. Com-
putational results suggest that central banks can improve welfare and maintain
macroeconomic stability if they allow the response coefficients in the interest rate
rule to vary according to the external volatility regime. The optimal simple rule
suggests that central banks should target inflation when external volatility is low
and stabilize exchange rates when it is high, which is akin to the “leaning against
the wind” approach adopted by some emerging market central banks.
Chapter 2 studies the optimal inflation target for an emerging market central
bank. Existing research on advanced economies shows that targeting core infla-
tion enables monetary policy to maximize welfare. This result is examined in the
context of emerging market economies, where a large proportion of households
are credit constrained and the share of food expenditures in total consumption ex-
penditures is high. Results obtained using an open economy model with incom-
plete financial markets indicate that headline inflation targeting improves welfare
outcomes. The optimal price index includes a positive weight on food prices but
assigns zero weight to import prices.
Chapter 3 studies the inter-sectoral distributional effects of monetary policy
in emerging market economies. Emerging market economies with fast-growing
tradable sectors often face appreciation pressure, and they tend to use monetary
policy to postpone currency appreciation and maintain export competitiveness. A
two-sector, heterogeneous-agent model with incomplete financial markets is de-
veloped to study the inter-sectoral distributional effects of such policy choices.
Relative to inflation targeting, exchange rate management can temporarily bene-
fit households in the tradable sector in high-growth periods, but these households
are worse off under the welfare criterion due to higher future consumption volatil-
ity. Capital controls and fixed exchange rate regimes amplify those distributional
effects.
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CHAPTER 1
CENTRAL BANK POLICY RESPONSES TO VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS
1.1 Introduction
Central banks in emerging markets have followed two major trends in policy re-
form over the past few decades: liberalizing their capital accounts and adopt-
ing a flexible exchange-rate regime. While emerging market economies continue
to impose more rigorous capital account regulations compared with advanced
economies, capital account openness has increased substantially.1 In the mean-
time, cross-border capital flows have risen dramatically (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti,
2007) and the fixed exchange-rate regime was abandoned in favor of a flexible
exchange-rate regime. Instead of pegging their currencies to the dollar, many
emerging market central banks are now adopting inflation targeting as the foun-
dation of their monetary policies (Roger, 2010).
However, having open capital accounts also makes emerging market
economies more vulnerable to large foreign interest rate shocks, often resulting in
volatile capital flows and considerable exchange-rate fluctuations. I construct the
real foreign interest rate processes for eight emerging market economies and find
strong evidence of time-varying volatility. The foreign interest rate process is char-
acterized by two regimes of shock volatility: the high-volatility regime and the
1See Chinn and Ito (2006) for more information about the capital account openness index they
construct, which is available at: http://web.pdx.edu/˜ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm
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low-volatility regime. Output and foreign exchange rates are much more volatile
under the high-volatility regime.
Thus, it is natural to ask how central banks should react when external volatil-
ity is high. While recent studies suggest that temporary central bank interven-
tion can be desirable (Farhi and Werning, 2014), many studies favor an inflation-
targeting interest rate rule (Galı´ and Monacelli, 2005), not to mention warning
about causing macroeconomic instability if the central bank chooses to respond
discretionarily. This divide among academic scholars has also influenced emerg-
ing market central banks–some of them favor temporary intervention, often re-
ferred to as “leaning against the wind,” while others are strict inflation targeters
(e.g. South Africa).
To answer this question, I develop a Markov-switching dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (MS-DSGE) model that features external shocks of time-
varying volatility to study the monetary policy choices of central banks in emerg-
ing markets. Driven by larger foreign interest rate shocks, an economy fluctuates
to a greater extent under the high-volatility regime. The central bank adopts an
interest rate rule that responds to inflation, the output gap, and exchange-rate
fluctuations, in which the response coefficients can vary under differing volatility
regimes. Thus, the question becomes whether allowing this dimension of flexibil-
ity can improve welfare without causing macroeconomic instability.
One major contribution of this chapter is that it is the first to examine whether
regime-switching monetary policy rules can ensure macroeconomic stability. I
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solve the MS-DSGE model using an algorithm from Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha
(2011) and estimate it using Thailand data from 2001Q1 to 2015Q2. I examine a
wide range of response coefficients in the interest rate rule and find that regime-
switching interest rate rules are unlikely to cause macroeconomic instability.
In addition, I find that temporary intervention is effective in terms of stabiliz-
ing the economy in highly volatile periods. I characterize the “leaning against the
wind” approach used by emerging market central banks as a regime-switching
interest rate rule that responds to exchange rate fluctuations more aggressively
under the high-volatility regime. I compare its performance with a constant-
coefficient inflation-targeting rule. The impulse responses indicate that output
and consumption fluctuate to a lesser extent under the former rule when the econ-
omy is hit by a large foreign interest rate shock.
Furthermore, welfare analysis shows that the optimal simple rule contains
some “leaning against the wind” features. The optimal simple rule features
no response to exchange-rate fluctuations under the low-volatility regime and a
strong response under the high-volatility regime. This is because, under the low-
volatility regime, the existence of productivity shocks and foreign demand shocks
creates trade-offs between stabilizing inflation and the exchange rate, so the op-
timal operating rule should not respond to the exchange rate. Under the high-
volatility regime, foreign interest rate shocks become the most important source
of disturbance so monetary policy should respond to exchange rate fluctuations
aggressively.
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Finally, my research makes an additional contribution in studying the effect
of temporary capital controls by allowing the central bank to adopt capital con-
trols depending on the external volatility regime. Capital control is modeled as
a quadratic portfolio adjustment cost, which reduces capital-flow volatility by in-
serting a wedge in the intertemporal Euler equation. It turns out that capital con-
trols can effectively stabilize aggregate output and consumption in the short run
but are welfare-reducing in the long run because households, anticipating pos-
sible capital controls in the future, will behave inefficiently under such circum-
stances.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related
literature on open economy macroeconomics and emerging market economies.
Section 1.3 studies foreign interest rates and empirically assesses the regime-
switching assumption. Section 1.4 develops the MS-DSGE model used to study
the problem as well as the solution algorithm. Section 1.5 summarizes the data
source and the estimation results. Section 1.6 explains the main results of the re-
search and section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This research builds upon two existing strands of literature: studies on the an-
alytical framework of the new open economy macroeconomics and studies on
emerging market economies. In this chapter, I try to link the existing analytical
4
framework with emerging market characteristics in order to achieve a better un-
derstanding of emerging market central banks and their policy choices.
The new open economy macroeconomics literature serves as the modeling
foundation. Recent examples of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) framework I employ in the chapter can be found in Clarida, Galı´, and
Gertler (2002) and Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006). In particular, I adapt the mod-
eling framework of Galı´ and Monacelli (2005), who develop a small open econ-
omy model with nominal rigidities. They suggest that it is optimal for a small
open economy central bank to target domestic inflation and the output gap.
More recently, there have been some attempts to incorporate more emerging
market features into the existing analytical framework. For instance, Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) suggest that emerging market economies face large nonstation-
ary productivity shocks so that growth trend fluctuations constitute their busi-
ness cycles. Garcı´a-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010) use a small open economy
with financial frictions to characterize business cycles in emerging markets.Liu
and Spiegel (2015) study optimal monetary policy and capital account restrictions
in a small open economy. Anand, Prasad, and Zhang (2015) find that an emerging
economy’s central bank should target headline inflation instead of core inflation.
Conceptually, the nature of many emerging market economies suggests that
their central banks should not operate entirely based on the experience of ad-
vanced economies. For example, emerging market economies face prevalent for-
eign interest shocks and country-specific risk premium shocks, which are partic-
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ularly important in the era after the global financial crisis due to unconventional
monetary policy. Uribe and Yue (2006) find that interest rate shocks represent an
important driver of business cycles in emerging countries, accounting for 30 per-
cent to 42 percent of the variance in output. If emerging market central banks are
reluctant to “import” monetary policy from abroad, they have to decide whether
to adopt a flexible exchange-rate regime or impose capital controls, and a recent
strand of research suggests that capital controls are necessary regardless of the
exchange-rate regime (Rey, 2015). Edwards (2015) also finds similar results based
on data from Latin America.
Another policy feature in emerging market economies is that capital controls
are much more prevalent. One important reason that prudential capital controls
are necessary is that households face pecuniary externalities. Bianchi (2011) devel-
ops a DSGE model with an occasionally binding collateral constraint and shows
that macroprudential policy limits overborrowing and improves welfare. Simi-
larly, Korinek (2011) differentiates prudential capital controls from traditional cap-
ital controls and argues that the former reduce the risk of financial crises. Apart
from pecuniary externalities, there are alternative channels that make prudential
capital controls appealing. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012) find that prudential
capital controls are helpful for peggers because of downward nominal wage rigid-
ity. Farhi and Werning (2014) prove that capital controls are welfare-improving
even under a flexible exchange-rate regime because they smooth intertemporal
terms of trade.
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1.3 Foreign Interest Rate Shocks
Since foreign interest rate shocks are a major driving force of business cycles in
emerging market economies and are directly responsible for volatile capital flows,
I start by characterizing the foreign interest rate process. I follow Uribe and Yue
(2006) and compute the real foreign interest rate for an emerging market economy
by adding the real US interest rate and its country spread together.
I compute the real foreign interest rates for eight emerging market economies:
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand, and
Uruguay. The real US interest rate is derived from the T-bill rate and inflation
while the country spread is retrieved from the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond
Index (EMBI). For all emerging market economies in the sample, country spreads
account for a major share of the variations in foreign interest rates.
Since the foreign interest rate is assumed to be exogenous in my model and
exhibits time-varying volatilities, I can estimate it separately using a regime-
switching model.2 I estimate the real foreign interest rate processes for the eight
emerging market economies individually using a univariate AR(1) model with
unobserved regime switches.
rt = (1 − ρr,st)r¯ + ρr,strt−1 + εt,st , εt,st ∼ N(0, σrst2) (1.1)
2Hamilton (1989) introduces regime-switching models into economics and I follow his algo-
rithm when estimating the real interest rate processes.
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Table 1.1: Estimates of Foreign Interest Rate Processes
Country ρr σrL σ
r
H pL pH
Argentina 0.90 0.29 3.34 0.95 0.76
Brazil 0.94 0.14 0.81 0.94 0.83
Ecuador 0.83 0.28 2.36 0.93 0.76
Malaysia 0.93 0.11 0.44 0.96 0.80
Mexico 0.91 0.13 0.85 0.98 0.82
South Africa 0.95 0.07 0.22 0.84 0.85
Thailand 0.97 0.08 0.33 0.92 0.82
Uruguay 0.94 0.12 0.74 0.93 0.73
Notes: Real interest rates are computed by adding US interest rates and country
spreads together. Data availability depends on individual countries. ρr is the
constant autoregressive coefficient. σrL and σ
R
H are the shock volatility under the
low- and high-volatility regimes, respectively. pL and pH are the probabilities of
remaining in the low- or high-volatility regime in the next period, respectively.
For all eight foreign interest rate series, the regime-switching estimation de-
tects two regimes, under which shock volatility differs significantly. The autore-
gressive coefficients are found to be constant across the two regimes, so foreign
interest rates can be modeled as AR(1) processes with time-varying volatility.
The parameter estimates are very similar across the eight emerging market
economies and the results are presented in Table 1.1. The median probabilities
of remaining in the low- or high-volatility regime in the next period are 0.95 and
0.80, respectively. The median standard deviations of foreign interest rate shocks
are around 0.1 and 0.5 under the low- or high-volatility regimes, respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Volatility Regime Probabilities and Policy Rate Responses
(a) Brazil (b) Malaysia
Notes: In the regime probability plot, the red (blue) line represents the probability that an
economy is under the high- (low-) volatility regime. The probabilities are estimated using
the regime-switching model in equation (1.1) and at any time, the two probabilities add
up to 1. In the interest and exchange rates plot, the blue line is the central bank policy rate
and the red line is the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) of a country.
Figure 1.1 visualizes the volatile regime switches in foreign interest rates and
the corresponding central bank policy responses. I plot the probability of volatil-
ity regimes, the nominal effective exchange rates (NEER), and the policy rates
separately for Brazil and Malaysia. As we can see, each country experiences sev-
eral switches between the low- and high-volatility regimes. For example, Brazil
encountered substantially higher foreign interest rates in 2002 and 2003 due to an
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increase in country spreads, accompanied by considerable currency depreciation.
On the other hand, foreign interest rates dropped significantly after the federal
reserve adopted unconventional monetary policy.
Notably, exchange rate fluctuations are larger under the high-volatility regime
and policy rates also appear to be more responsive to foreign exchange rate fluc-
tuations. This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that emerging market
central banks prefer “leaning against the wind” when external volatility is high.
1.4 Model
To study the implications of adopting regime-switching monetary policy rules in
emerging market economies, I develop a small open economy model with nomi-
nal rigidities and foreign interest rates of time-varying volatilities. In contrast to
the simplifying assumption of complete markets in Galı´ and Monacelli (2005), the
home economy can access the international financial market only through risk-
free borrowing and lending, which is subject to foreign interest rate shocks.
Foreign interest rates are characterized by a Markov process with two under-
lying regimes: the high-volatility regime and the low-volatility regime. Under
the high-volatility regime, foreign interest rate shocks are larger whereas under
the low-volatility regime they are smaller. Consequently, capital flows are more
volatile under the high-volatility regime. I then study whether central banks
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should intervene during periods of volatile capital flows and, if so, what policy
instruments they should use.
1.4.1 Households
The home economy consists of a large number of identical and infinitely-lived
households that consume both domestically produced goods and foreign imports.
The representative household maximizes the discounted stream of utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct,Nt) (1.2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, Ct is the composite consumption of the
representative household in period t, including home and foreign goods, and Nt
is the labor supplied by the representative household. The utility function takes
the form:
U(Ct,Nt) =
(
Ct1−σ
1 − σ − ψ
Nt1+φ
1 + φ
)
(1.3)
where σ is the risk-aversion coefficient, the parameter ψ is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity, and φ is the scaling factor. The composite consumption is defined as
Ct = (a
1
ηCH,t
η−1
η + (1 − a) 1ηCF,t
η−1
η )
η
η−1 (1.4)
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whereCH,t represents home goods andCF,t represents foreign goods. The elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods is given by η ∈ (0,+∞) and a ∈
(0, 1) is the weight on home goods in the composite consumption index, which
reflects the degree of home bias in preferences. The composite home good CH,t
comprises a continuum of differentiated goods:
CH,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
CH,t( j)
ε−1
ε d j
) ε
ε−1
(1.5)
where ε > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between any two differenti-
ated home goods.
1.4.2 Budget constraints
A representative household maximizes its lifetime utility given by equation (1.2)
subject to the following budget constraint:
PtCt + etB∗t +
ψB
2
etB∗t
2
+ Bt = WtNt + R∗t−1etB
∗
t−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Tt (1.6)
where Bt and B∗t represent one-period risk-free nominal bonds denominated in do-
mestic and foreign currencies, respectively. The nominal exchange rate is denoted
by et and the gross nominal interest rates for the two types of bonds are denoted
by Rt and R∗t , respectively. Wt is the nominal wage and and Nt is the labor supply.
Tt contains lump sum taxes and transfers from the government and profits from
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firms.
In addition, ψB, a quadratic portfolio holding cost for foreign bond holdings,
serves two purposes in the model. When no capital control is imposed, the
value of this parameter is negligible, only to ensure the stationarity of the sys-
tem (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003). Alternatively, the central bank can impose
capital controls to smooth international capital flows, which appears as a wedge
in the intertemporal Euler equation (Chang, Liu, and Spiegel, 2015).3
The total expenditure needed to attain a consumption index Ct is given by PtCt
where Pt is defined as
Pt =
[
aP1−ηH,t + (1 − a)P1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η (1.7)
PH,t, the price index of home goods, is defined as
PH,t =
[∫ 1
0
PH,t( j)1−εd j
] 1
1−ε
(1.8)
3I assume that, in the baseline model, there is no capital control in place. The optimal capital
control policy will be discussed as an extension. Notably, capital controls affect households’ in-
tertemporal decisions without altering their budget constraints; any tax revenues or subsidy costs
will be transferred to households in a lump sum fashion.
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1.4.3 Households’ optimality condition
A set of intertemporal optimality conditions arises from the representative house-
hold’s bond-holding decisions. The optimality condition derived from the hold-
ing of domestic currency denominated bond is given by:
Et
[
βtRt
(
Pt
Pt+1
) (
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ]
= 1 (1.9)
The following optimality condition applies to the holding of foreign currency-
denominated bonds:
Et
[
βt
R∗t
1 + ψBB∗t
(
qt+1
qt
) (
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ]
= 1 (1.10)
where ψB appears as a wedge in the Euler equation, as mentioned above. With-
out capital controls, the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) holds in expectation.
Thus, capital controls limit capital flows by reducing effective interest rate differ-
entials.
Apart from consumption decisions, the representative household also decides
how much labor to supply each period. The marginal utility of wage income
equates to the marginal disutility of the labor supply.
ψCtσNtφ =
Wt
Pt
(1.11)
14
1.4.4 Production
Firms use a linear technology in labor, YH,t( j) = AtNt( j), to produce home goods
and they are subject to common productivity shock At, given by:
log(
At
A¯
) = ρalog(
At−1
A¯
) + εat , ε
a
t ∼ N(0, σ2a) (1.12)
Following Calvo (1983), I assume that a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of firms cannot
change their prices in each period. The remaining firms choose optimal reset
prices to maximize their discounted future profits.
max
PH,t( j)
Et
∞∑
s=0
{
(θ)sQt,t+k
[
PH,t( j) − MCH,t+s]YH,t+s( j)} (1.13)
where MC denotes the marginal cost of production in nominal terms and Qt,t+k is
the stochastic discount factor.
1.4.5 External variables
The small open economy is heavily influenced by the external environment
through two major channels, foreign demand for home goods and the foreign in-
terest rate. Aggregate demand for home goods is the sum of domestic and foreign
demand, which is given by:
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YH,t = a
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct + (1 − a)
(
PH,t
PF,t
)−η
C∗t (1.14)
where C∗t is aggregate foreign demand, which is normalized such that in the
steady state it is equal to the steady-state level of aggregate home consumption. I
assume that aggregate foreign demand follows an AR(1) process given by:
log
(
C∗t
C¯∗
)
= ρclog
(
C∗t−1
C¯∗
)
+ εct , ε
c
t ∼ N(0, σ2c) (1.15)
More importantly, emerging market economies face recurrent episodes of per-
sistent foreign interest rate shocks, leading to volatile capital flows. To capture
this feature, I allow the foreign interest rate process to be regime-specific. Un-
der the low-volatility regime, foreign interest rates follow an AR(1) process with
a smaller persistence parameter and less variance in shocks. Under the high-
volatility regime, the foreign interest rate process is more persistent and the shock
variance is larger.
log
(
R∗t
R¯∗
)
= ρr,st log
(
R∗t
R¯∗
)
+ εrt,st , ε
r
t ∼ N(0, σrst2) (1.16)
1.4.6 Regime switches
To capture the recurrent episodes of volatile capital flows in emerging market
economies, I allow the economy to switch between two underlying regimes: the
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high-volatility regime (H) and the low-volatility regime (L). The regime switches
according to a Markov chain and its transition matrix is denoted as Π, such that
pii, j represents the probability of switching to the jth regime from the ith regime.
The transition matrix Π is given by:
Π =
 pHH 1 − pHH1 − pLL pLL
 (1.17)
Consequently, the foreign interest rate process is characterized by persistence
coefficient ρr,H and shock standard deviation σrH under the high-volatility regime,
and ρr,L and σrL under the low-volatility regime.
More importantly, the central bank can choose whether to impose a regime-
switching monetary policy or stick to a constant inflation-targeting rule. If the
central bank operates differentially across regimes, its policy regimes can be char-
acterized as regime-dependent response coefficients.
1.4.7 Monetary policy
Aggregate inflation is defined as pit= Pt/Pt−1 and home goods inflation as piH,t =
PH,t/PH,t−1. The steady state is characterized by zero inflation.
The central bank determines the short-term nominal interest rate Rt according
to a simple inflation-targeting rule, by which interest rates respond to inflation
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and possibly to exchange-rate fluctuations (see, e.g., Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007):
log
(
Rt
R
)
= ρ log
(
Rt−1
R
)
+ (1 − ρ)
[
φpilog
(
pit
pi
)
+ φylog
(
Yt
Yt
)
+ φelog
(
qt
qt−1
)]
(1.18)
where p¯i, Y¯ , and R¯ are the steady state values of inflation, output, and the nomi-
nal interest rate. The term ρ is the interest rate smoothing parameter. φpi, φy and
φe are the weights assigned by the central banker to the deviations of inflation
and output from their steady-state levels and to fluctuations of the real exchange
rate.4 Setting the parameter φe at zero implies a pure inflation-targeting regime,
under which the central bank responds only to inflation. In contrast, a positive φe
indicates the will of stabilizing real exchange rate fluctuations.
When the coefficients in the monetary policy rule depend on the external
volatility regime, I call it a regime-switching policy rule. The main goal of the
chapter is to study whether regime-switching monetary policy rules are more de-
sirable given that emerging market economies face time-varying external volatil-
ity.
1.4.8 Solution methods
MS-DSGE models have received increasing attention recently as they incorporate
the richness of regime switches into a DSGE model. Davig and Leeper (2007) de-
4This formulation is in line with the stated objective of many emerging market central banks,
namely “leaning against the wind”.
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velops a MS-DSGE model to study the interaction and regime switches of fiscal
and monetary policy. Bianchi (2013) estimates a medium-scale MS-DSGE model
with Bayesian techniques and finds repeated fluctuations of monetary policy be-
tween hawkish and dovish regimes. Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011) and Foer-
ster et al. (2014) develop powerful techniques to solve MS-DSGE models.
In this chapter, I use the minimal state variables solution algorithm developed
by Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011) due to its robustness and speed of conver-
gence. The outline of the algorithm and my approach to implementing it are given
below:
First, I log-linearize the system around its steady state for each specific regime
and write the system of equations in the following form:
A(st)xt = B(st)xt−1 + Ψ(st)εt + Π(st)ηt, (1.19)
where the parameter matrices depend on the regime state in period t. xt is a vector
of endogenous and predetermined variables, εt is a vector of exogenous shocks,
and ηt is a vector of expectational errors.
Second, I implement the algorithm in Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011) and
transform the problem into one of finding the roots of quadratic polynomial func-
tions. Then xt and ηt can be written as the linear transformation of xt−1 and εt,
given by:
19
xt = VstF1,st xt−1 + VstG1,stεt (1.20)
ηt = −(F2,st xt−1 +G2,stεt) (1.21)
where Vst , F1,st , F2,st ,G1,st , and G2,st are matrices solved based on the quadractic
polynomial functions. Equations (1.20) and (1.21) are solutions to the system char-
acterized by (1.19).
Finally, there can be multiple minimal state variables solutions for a given MS-
DSGE model. To find all solutions, I randomly select from a number of initial
values and compute the corresponding solutions until they converge. Then, as
suggested by Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011), there is a mapping from the root
of the equation to the solution of the model. According to Proposition 3.9, p.36
and Proposition 3.33, p.49 in Costa, Fragoso, and Marques (2005), the candidate
solution is stationary (mean-square-stable) if and only if all eigenvalues of the
matrix in equation (10) of Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011) are inside the unit
circle.
As a result, checking the stationarity of the solution is equivalent to checking
the size of the dominant eigenvalue of that matrix. If there is only one solution
with dominant eigenvalue smaller than 1, there is no need for selection. If there
are multiple solutions with dominant eigenvalues smaller than 1, one can use the
likelihood method and select the equilibrium that delivers the highest likelihood
value with respect to the data. This is especially appealing when estimating the
model using real data.
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1.4.9 Welfare function
A well-defined micro-founded welfare criterion is needed in order to compare
policy choices. In general, there are two major ways to evaluate welfare: the
linear-quadratic approach and the second-order approximation approach. The
linear-quadratic approach obtains an analytic expression of the welfare function
by approximating the equilibrium conditions up to the first order and the welfare
function up to the second order Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). However, it
may sometimes generate spurious results because some important second-order
terms are ignored (Kim and Kim, 2003).
Alternatively, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004, 2007) develop a numerical
method to evaluate welfare under various policy environments by approximat-
ing the whole system of equations up to the second order. While this method is
accurate, the lack of an analytic expression of the welfare function prohibits fur-
ther theoretical analysis. Furthermore, it does not apply to MS-DSGE models.
In this chapter, I use the pure quadratic approximation method proposed by
Benigno and Woodford (2012) to derive the welfare function analytically. To be
more specific, I approximate the welfare function to the second order and elimi-
nate all the first-order terms using equilibrium conditions. Unlike the traditional
linear-quadratic method, the equilibrium conditions are approximated to the sec-
ond order in order to get a pure quadratic approximation of the welfare function.
According to the derivation in Appendix A.2, the loss function based on the
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pure quadratic approximation can be written in the following fashion:
Lt0 = UcC¯Et0
∑
βt
[
1
2
y′tLyyt + y
′
tLeet +
1
2
lpˆi(pˆiHt )
2
]
+ t.i.p. + O(||ξ||3) (1.22)
where yt = [yˆt, cˆt, pˆH,t, Qˆt] are endogenous variables, et = [aˆt, iˆ∗t , cˆ∗t ] are external
shocks, and Lt, Le, and lpˆi are matrices and the scalar derived in the appendix.
Thus, not only do output and inflation enter the loss function, the real ex-
change rate also plays a significant role, which is consistent with De Paoli (2009).
Based on the loss function, I compare alternative policy choices in the MS-DSGE
model.
1.5 Data and Estimation
I estimate my DSGE model using data from Thailand. I use Thailand data be-
cause Thailand was one of the first emerging market economies to adopt inflation
targeting so using data from Thailand gives me a longer time series. The sample
ranges from 2000Q1 through 2015Q2 because Thailand adopted inflation target-
ing in 2000. A thorough guide to MS-DSGE model estimation can be found in
Bianchi (2013).
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1.5.1 Data
I estimate the model using five observable data series: inflation, the GDP growth
rate, the nominal effective exchange rate, the real effective exchange rate, and the
domestic interest rate. All data are retrieved from the CEIC database. I use X-
13 filter to compute the seasonally adjusted quarter-by-quarter GDP growth rate.
To equate the number of observable variables with the number of shocks, I add
two additional types of shocks which are common in the literature, i.e., monetary
policy shocks and foreign inflation shocks.
1.5.2 Prior values
Calibrating such a model is challenging as there is no consensus on the values
of some parameters for emerging market economies. As a result, I pick parame-
ter values from the existing literature as the means of the prior distributions and
use Bayesian methods to estimate the model. Prior means and posterior modes
are summarized in Table 1.2. The time period in the model is equivalent to one
quarter.
I choose β = 0.995, which is equivalent to the observed annual real interest
rate of 2 percent. The prior mean of σ, the risk-aversion parameter, is set at 2,
a value commonly used in the literature on emerging market economies (Aguiar
and Gopinath, 2007; Anand, Prasad, and Zhang, 2015; Garcı´a-Cicco, Pancrazi, and
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Uribe, 2010). The share of home-produced tradable goods, denoted by a, is set at
0.7, which implies that home goods account for 70% of domestic consumption
(Galı´ and Monacelli, 2005).
The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is assumed to
be 1 (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2005). The Frisch elasticity (1/ψ) is assumed to be 1/3
(in other words, ψ = 3). For the monetary policy parameters, I use loose priors
and choose ρ = 0.5, φpi = 1.5, φe = 0.25, φy = 0.125.
Lastly, I use the estimates of the foreign interest rate processes to pin down the
parameter values that are regime-specific. For the persistence parameter of the
foreign interest rate process, ρr, I set the value at 0.93 based on the median of the
estimates. The standard deviations of shocks are set at (0.1) under the high- (low-)
volatility regime.
1.5.3 Bayesian estimation
Based on the above-mentioned prior values, I implement Bayesian estimation us-
ing Thailand macroeconomic data from 2010Q1 - 2015Q2. I split the sample into
two sub-samples, the pre-financial crisis period and the post-financial crisis pe-
riod. The results are summarized in Table 1.2.
The estimates of structural variables are very close under both regimes while
the interest rate rule parameters and shock parameters are very different, consis-
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Table 1.2: Bayesian Estimation Results
Parameter Prior Posterior Mode
mean std. dev. 00Q1 - 07Q2 07Q3 - 15Q2
β 0.995 0.005 0.996 0.996
σ 2 0.75 2.57 2.24
a 0.7 0.1 0.81 0.78
η 1 0.5 0.87 1.01
ψ 3 1 2.53 2.33
ρ 0.5 0.2 0.92 0.94
φpi 1.5 0.5 1.93 1.28
φe 0.25 0.13 0.16 0.28
φy 0.125 0.07 0.08 0.09
Notes: Parameters are estimated using the Random-walk Metropolis algorithm with
100,000 draws. The prior distributions are borrowed from the existing literature.
tent with the regime-switching assumption. Based on the parameter values from
Bayesian estimation results, I then compute the impulse responses and welfare
outcomes under various policy choices.
1.6 Main Results
Based upon the model developed and estimated above, I now examine three as-
pects of the desirability of regime-switching policy rules. First, it is crucial to
verify that regime-switching policy rules ensure macroeconomic stability. Other-
wise, they are strictly dominated by any inflation-targeting rules that can achieve
this goal. This can be done by examining the existence and uniqueness of rational-
expectation equilibrium under a wide range of policy coefficients.
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Second, it is useful to know whether regime-switching monetary policy rules
would lead to more stable aggregate output when the home economy faces large
foreign interest rate shocks. The major reason that emerging market central banks
deviate temporarily from inflation-targeting rules and stabilize their exchange
rates is that targeting inflation is not sufficient to stabilize the home economy. This
can be analyzed by comparing impulse responses to foreign interest rate shocks
under inflation-targeting rules and regime-switching rules.
Lastly, it is important to understand the welfare outcomes when regime-
switching policy rules are allowed. Using the method discussed above, I can ap-
proximate the welfare function up to the second order and numerically calculate
the welfare levels under various types of policy rules. This allows me to study the
welfare outcomes and search for the optimal simple rule.
1.6.1 Macroeconomic stability
A major advantage of operating monetary policy based on explicit interest rate
rules is that it ensures macroeconomic stability. For example, the famous Tay-
lor principle suggests that in order to ensure macroeconomic stability, the central
bank should adjust interest rates more than one-to-one in response to changes in
inflation rates (Davig and Leeper, 2007).
In practice, ensuring macroeconomic stability is not an easy task, as some
seemingly reasonable monetary policy rules will in fact cause macroeconomic in-
26
Figure 1.2: Macroeconomic Stability under Varying Policy Coefficients
Notes: This figure shows the stability status of the economy conditional on varying val-
ues of inflation and exchange-rate response coefficients. A black plus sign means that the
rational-expectation equilibrium uniquely exists while a red circle implies that the equi-
librium is either non-unique or does not exist. The interest rate smoothing coefficient ρ
is set at 0.7 and the inflation response coefficient φpi at 2, which are plausible parameter
values according to the estimation.
stability. For example, Uribe (2003) finds that targeting the real exchange rate can
generate aggregate instability due to self-fulfilling expectations.
Using the model developed and estimated above, I examine the existence and
uniqueness of the rational-expectation equilibrium under a wide range of pol-
icy coefficients. Generally speaking, macroeconomic stability is ensured under
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such regime-switching policy rules. A detailed example is given in Figure 1.2,
in which I present the stability status under varying values of φpi and φe, which
are coefficients governing the interest rate response to inflation and exchange-rate
fluctuations.
According to Figure 1.2, as long as the Taylor principle is met, namely, φpi > 1,
macroeconomic stability is achieved. Thus, for an emerging market central bank,
adopting regime-switching monetary policy rules is not going to impose any addi-
tional limits compared with pure inflation-targeting rules. This is a very desirable
property.
1.6.2 Impulse responses
Since emerging market central banks are concerned with large economic fluctua-
tions that are due to foreign interest rate shocks, I now examine whether temporar-
ily smoothing exchange rates can effectively stabilize the domestic economy. To
be more specific, I compare impulse response functions under the pure inflation-
targeting rule and a regime-switching rule that temporarily smooths exchange
rates. The home economy is under the high-volatility regime and faces a one-
standard-deviation positive foreign interest rate shock, which can be thought of
as a sudden stop. The impulse responses are plotted in Figure 1.3.
The impulse responses show that temporary exchange rate smoothing leads to
a higher domestic interest rate, which smooths nominal and real exchange rates
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Responses to a Positive Foreign Interest Rate Shock (High-
volatility Regime)
Notes: This figure shows the responses of several variables to a one-standard-deviation
foreign interest rate shock under the high-volatility regime. Two policy rules are con-
sidered. The black solid lines are impulse responses under the pure inflation-targeting
rule and the red dashed lines represent impulse responses under the regime-switching
rule (temporary exchange rate smoothing). The responses are all expressed as percentage
deviations from the steady-state values of the corresponding variables. An increase in
the exchange rate (both nominal and real) indicates depreciation.
as well as domestic inflation and output. A higher domestic interest rate reduces
currency depreciation and capital outflows. It also stabilizes output by reducing
producer inflation. Thus, monetary policy that temporarily smooths exchange
rates can help stabilize aggregate output in the short run.
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1.6.3 Welfare analysis of regime-switching monetary policy
While regime-switching monetary policy that temporarily smooths exchange
rates can mitigate the fluctuation of aggregate output during periods of volatile
capital flows, its desirability remains questionable unless its welfare properties
are well understood.
Conceptually, regime-switching monetary policy that temporarily smooths ex-
change rates should be welfare-improving compared with pure inflation-targeting
rules because large foreign interest rate shocks cause volatile capital flows and
large fluctuations in net exports. As a result, the home economy incurs welfare
loss because of inefficient fluctuations in the terms of trade due to nominal rigidi-
ties. By temporarily smoothing exchange rates, emerging market central banks
can smooth production and consequently stabilize the terms of trade.
Using the method explained above, I approximate the welfare function up to
the second order and compute welfare outcomes under various monetary policy
rules. In particular, I look for the optimal simple rule by searching for the coeffi-
cient combination that maximizes welfare.5
There is one particularly interesting feature of the pattern of optimal monetary
policy. If I control for the other coefficients and vary the response to exchange-
rate fluctuations under contrasting volatility regimes, it is clear that the welfare
5Detailed results are available upon request. I use constrained optimization methods to search
for the optimal simple rule.
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Figure 1.4: Welfare Gains under Various Regime-switching Policy Coefficients
Notes: This figure shows the relative welfare gains under various values of φe. The
interest rate smoothing coefficient ρ is set at 0.7, the inflation response coefficient φpi is set
at 2, and the output gap response coefficient ρy is set at 0, which are plausible parameter
values according to the estimation. The two axes on the plane correspond to the exchange
rate response coefficients under the high-volatility regime and the low-volatility regime.
The vertical axis displays the relative welfare gain. The result suggests that welfare is
higher if φe is zero under the low-volatility regime and very high under the high-volatility
regime. The results are robust under alternative parameter values.
level is higher when there is no response to exchange-rate fluctuations under the
low-volatility regime and strong response under the high-volatility regime. This
relationship is shown in Figure 1.4.
In fact, the optimal simple rule contains some “leaning against the wind” fea-
tures as it suggests that the central bank should respond to exchange-rate fluctua-
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tions only under the high-volatility regime. This is because, under the low volatil-
ity regime, the existence of productivity shocks and foreign demand shocks cre-
ates trade-offs between stabilizing inflation and the exchange rate, so the optimal
operating rule should not respond to the exchange rate. Under the high-volatility
regime, however, foreign interest rate shocks become the most important source
of disturbance so monetary policy should respond to exchange-rate fluctuations
aggressively.
1.6.4 Capital controls
In the baseline model, I assume that no capital controls are imposed and house-
holds can freely borrow and save via the international financial market. However,
many emerging market central banks impose temporary capital controls when
facing volatile capital flows and it is important to understand the consequences of
such intervention.
I model capital controls as quadratic portfolio adjustment costs when house-
holds change their bond holdings Γt(B∗t , B∗t−1) = ψB(B
∗
t − B∗t−1)2. Capital controls re-
duce capital flow volatility by inserting a wedge in the intertemporal Euler equa-
tion, as shown below. Notably, any costs or revenues from capital controls are
transferred to households in lump sum fashion so that capital controls have no
wealth effect.
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Et
{
βt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ [ R∗t
1 + ψB(B∗t − B∗t−1)
qt+1
qt
− Rt
pit+1
]}
= 0 (1.23)
I now use the extended model to study the implications of imposing temporary
capital controls. First, temporary capital controls will not jeopardize macroeco-
nomic stability. Furthermore, imposing temporary capital controls can effectively
stabilize aggregate output and consumption when the home economy faces large
foreign interest rate shocks. This can be found in the impulse responses shown in
Figure 1.5.
According to Figure 1.5, capital controls are much more effective at stabiliz-
ing aggregate output and consumption because they substantially reduce capital
flows in the short run. The wedge placed in the intertemporal Euler equation
gives the central bank a certain degree of flexibility as it does not need to adjust
the domestic interest rate to minimize capital flows. With the adjustment cost,
households are no longer as willing to save or borrow in foreign currency de-
nominated bonds, so aggregate output and consumption are less volatile given
temporary capital controls.
I then study the welfare effect of capital controls by allowing the central bank
to incorporate capital controls as part of the regime-switching policy rules and im-
pose them only under the high-volatility regime. It turns out that capital controls
are welfare-reducing because households, anticipating possible capital controls in
the future, will behave inefficiently under such circumstances. Detailed welfare
comparisons are available upon request.
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Figure 1.5: Impulse Responses to a Positive Foreign Interest Rate Shock (with Cap-
ital Controls)
Notes: This figure shows the responses of several variables to a one-standard-deviation
foreign interest rate shock under the high-volatility regime. Three policy rules are
considered. The black solid lines are impulse responses under a pure inflation-targeting
rule, the red dashed lines represent impulse responses under a temporary exchange-
rate smoothing rule, and the blue dash-dot lines show impulse responses under an
inflation-targeting rule with temporary capital controls. The responses are all expressed
as percentage deviations from the steady-state values of the corresponding variables. An
increase in the exchange rate (both nominal and real) indicates depreciation.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
Emerging market economies frequently experience volatile capital flows and con-
siderable exchange-rate fluctuations caused by large foreign interest rate shocks,
so it is natural to ask how central banks should react when external volatility is
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high. Using data from emerging market economies, I develop a Markov-switching
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (MS-DSGE) model that features external
shocks of time-varying volatility to study their monetary policy choices.
I find that by allowing the response coefficients in the interest rate rule to vary
according to the regime of external volatility, the central bank can improve wel-
fare while maintaining macroeconomic stability. The optimal simple rule suggests
that the central bank should target inflation when external volatility is low and
stabilize exchange rates when it is high, which is akin to the “leaning against the
wind” approach adopted by many emerging market central banks. Temporary
capital controls are effective in terms of short-term stabilization but are inferior in
terms of welfare outcomes.
One interesting direction for future research would be relaxing the assump-
tion of perfect information between households and the central bank. The first
scenario would be that the state of external volatility is observable but house-
holds do not have full information of the monetary policy rule under this regime,
so they have to learn from the observed policy rates. This will no doubt reduce
the effectiveness of monetary policy and it is a very realistic scenario in emerging
market economies given the weak reputation of the central banks.
The second scenario would be that the state of external volatility is unobserv-
able but the policy regime is, so households learn the state of the economy from
the central bank policy regime. If so, policy regime switches can be potentially
detrimental because central banks may create and amplify economic crises by
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making the state of the economy explicit. This is also possible given information
frictions in emerging market economies.
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CHAPTER 2
WHAT MEASURE OF INFLATION SHOULD AN EMERGING MARKET
CENTRAL BANK TARGET?
2.1 Introduction
Most central banks view low and stable inflation as a primary, if not dominant,
objective of monetary policy. In the existing literature, the choice of price index to
target has been guided by the idea that inflation is a monetary phenomenon. Core
inflation (excluding food, energy, and other volatile components from headline
CPI) has been viewed as the most appropriate measure of inflation since fluctua-
tions in food and energy prices represent supply shocks and are non-monetary in
nature (Wynne, 2008). Moreover, since these shocks are transitory, highly volatile,
and do not reflect changes in the underlying rate of inflation, they should not be
a part of the targeted price index (Mishkin, 2007, 2008).
Previous authors have used models with price and/or wage stickiness to show
that targeting core inflation maximizes welfare. Existing models have looked at
complete market settings where price stickiness is the only distortion (besides
monopoly power). Infrequent price adjustments cause mark-ups to fluctuate and
also distort relative prices. In order to restore the flexible price equilibrium, central
banks should try to minimize these fluctuations by targeting sticky prices (Good-
friend and King, 1997, 2001).
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Using a New Keynesian model, Aoki (2001) demonstrates that targeting infla-
tion in the sticky price sector leads to macroeconomic stability and welfare maxi-
mization. Targeting core inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the aggregate output
gap as output and inflation move in the same direction under complete markets.
Benigno (2004) argues that in a common currency area the central bank should tar-
get an index that gives higher weight to inflation in regions with a higher degree of
nominal rigidity, effectively ignoring exchange rate and commodity price fluctu-
ations. In a more general multi-sector setting, Mankiw and Reis (2003) show that,
in order to improve the stability of economic activity, the targeted “stability” price
index should put more weight on sectors that have sluggish price adjustment, are
more procyclical, and have a smaller weight in the consumer price index.
The results from the prior literature generally rely on the assumption that mar-
kets are complete (allowing households to fully insure against idiosyncratic risks).
The central bank then only needs to tackle the distortions created by price sticki-
ness. However, in emerging market economies, a substantial fraction of agents are
unable to smooth their consumption in a manner consistent with the permanent
income hypothesis. Moreover, emerging market economies have other structural
differences from advanced economies, including the relatively high share of food
in household consumption expenditures.
In this chapter, I provide an analytical framework for determining the opti-
mal price index for emerging market central banks to target. The chapter makes
three main contributions. First, it generalizes the benchmark results of Aoki (2001)
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and Benigno (2004) by developing a model that encompasses their frameworks.
Second, it shows that incomplete financial markets and other characteristics of
emerging market economies substantially alter the key results. Third, it derives
optimal price indexes and compare them with feasible rules such as headline in-
flation targeting that also improve welfare relative to core inflation targeting but
are easier for central banks to communicate and implement.
My model has three sectors to make it more representative of the structures of
emerging market economies. First, the food (or informal) sector, which comprises
a large fraction of the economy and where prices are flexible. Workers in this sec-
tor live hand-to-mouth, i.e., they have no access to credit markets and simply con-
sume their current labor income. Second, the sticky price (or formal) sector that
is subject to productivity and mark-up shocks, and where workers do have access
to credit markets. Third, a sector that is open to foreign trade and where prices
are flexible but also highly volatile. This sector, which proxies for the commodity-
producing sector, faces large external shocks.
Financial frictions that result in consumers being credit constrained have not
received much attention in models of inflation targeting. When markets are not
complete and agents differ in their ability to smooth consumption, their welfare
depends on the nature of idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, this model also allows me
to analyze the welfare distribution under alternative inflation targeting rules. Un-
der incomplete markets, household income, which is influenced by the nature of
shocks and the price elasticity of the demand for goods, matters for consumption
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choices. For instance, a negative productivity shock to a good with a low price
elasticity of demand could increase the income of net sellers of that good and
raise the expenditure of net buyers of that good.
My model incorporates other important features relevant to emerging market
economies. In these countries, expenditure on food constitutes 40-50 percent of
household expenditures, compared to 10-15 percent in advanced economies. Low
price and income elasticities of food expenditures as well as low income levels
make the welfare of agents in emerging market economies more sensitive to fluc-
tuations in food prices. These features imply that agents factor in food price in-
flation while bargaining over wages, thus affecting broader inflation expectations
(Walsh, 2011). Thus, in emerging market economies even inflation expectation
targeting central banks must take into account food price inflation.
The key result is that in the presence of financial frictions targeting headline
CPI inflation improves aggregate welfare relative to targeting core inflation (i.e.,
inflation in the sticky price sector). Lack of access to financial markets makes
the demand of credit-constrained consumers insensitive to interest rates. These
consumers’ demand depends only on real wages, establishing a link between ag-
gregate demand and real wages. Thus, the relative price of the good produced in
the flexible price sector not only affects aggregate supply but, through its effects
on real wages, also influences aggregate demand.
My model allows me to compute optimal price indexes that maximize welfare.
The optimal price index also includes a positive weight on food prices but, unlike
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headline inflation, generally assigns zero weight to import prices. This is because
agents in that sector have access to financial markets and, unlike in the case of
food, the price elasticity of the demand for goods produced in this sector is high.
These results differ from those of the prior literature based on complete mar-
kets settings. For instance, in Aoki’s (2001) model, relative prices of the flexible
price sector only appear as a shift parameter of inflation in the sticky price sector.
Under incomplete markets, by contrast, the central bank has to respond to price
fluctuations in the flexible price sector in order to manage aggregate demand.
Financial frictions break the comovement of inflation and output, implying that
stabilizing core inflation no longer stabilizes the output gap. Thus, in the presence
of financial frictions, targeting a broader measure of inflation improves welfare.
In related work, Cata˜o and Chang (2010) show that, for a small open econ-
omy that is a net buyer of food, the high volatility of world food prices causes
headline CPI inflation targeting to dominate core CPI inflation targeting. Adding
this feature would strengthen the results but make my model less general since
few emerging market economies import a large share of their food consumption.
Frankel (2008) argues that a small commodity-exporting economy should target
the export price index in order to accommodate terms of trade shocks. The re-
sults suggest that ignoring sectors with nominal rigidities and targeting this set
of flexible prices, which has a small weight in the domestic CPI, would reduce
welfare.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains some empirical facts
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to further motivate the structure of the model and its relevance to emerging mar-
ket economies. Section 2.3 outlines the main features of the model and contrasts
them with the prior literature. Section 2.4 presents the main results and Section 2.5
contains various sensitivity experiments to check the robustness of the baseline re-
sults and also presents some extensions of the basic model. Section 2.6 concludes
the chapter.
2.2 Basic Stylized Facts
I first discuss some stylized facts that are relevant to monetary policy formulation
in emerging countries, starting with the share of food in household consumption
expenditures and measures of the elasticity of food expenditures. Engel’s law
states that as average household income increases, the average share of food ex-
penditure in total household expenditure declines. When this idea is extended
to countries, poorer countries would be expected to have a higher average share
of food expenditure in total household expenditure. In Table 2.1, I present recent
data on shares of food expenditure in total expenditure for selected emerging and
advanced economies. As expected, expenditure on food constitutes a much larger
share of total household expenditure in emerging relative to advanced economies.
Moreover, the income elasticity of food in emerging market economies is on
average twice as large as that in advanced economies (0.63 versus 0.30 for a se-
lected group of economies). The average price elasticity of food is much lower
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Table 2.1: Share of Food Expenditure in Total Household Expenditure
Emerging Economies Food Expenditure Advanced Economies Food Expenditure
Indonesia 53.0 Japan 14.7
Vietnam 49.8 Germany 11.5
India 48.8 Australia 10.8
China 36.7 Canada 9.3
Russia 33.2 United Kingdom 8.8
Malaysia 28.0 USA 5.7
Average 41.6 Average 10.1
Source: Household Surveys, CEIC, International Food Consumption Patterns Dataset,
Economic Research Service, USDA and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Data for emerging market economies are for 2005 while for advanced economies
data are for 2006. Expenditure on food includes expenditure on food consumed at home
only and does not include expenditure on beverages and tobacco.
in absolute terms than the typical assumption of a unitary price elasticity, sug-
gesting that food is a necessary good. As the share of expenditure on food is
high in emerging market economies, the price elasticity of food is higher in these
economies (average of about -0.38) but still lower than the value normally used
in the literature. Low price and income elasticities of the demand for food have
considerable significance for the choice of price index.
To examine the extent of credit constraints in emerging countries, Table 2.2
presents data from the World Bank (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Klapper, 2012) on the
percentage of the adult population with access to formal finance (the share of
the population using formal financial services) in emerging countries. These data
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Table 2.2: Composite Measure of Access to Financial Services in Emerging
Economies
Selected Economies Percent with Access Selected Economies Percent with Access
Argentina 33 Nigeria 30
Brazil 56 Philippines 27
Chile 42 Poland 70
China 64 Russia 48
India 35 South Africa 54
Indonesia 20 Thailand 73
Kenya 42 Turkey 58
Malaysia 66
Median (29 Emerging Economies): 42 Median (27 Advanced Economies): 96
Source: Global Findex Database, World Bank, 2011.
Notes: The composite indicator measures the percentage of the adult population with
access to an account with a financial intermediary. The table only shows data for a selected
group of individual emerging market economies. Reported medians are based on a larger
sample of emerging and advanced economies available in the database.
show that, on average, more than half of the population in emerging countries
lacks access to the formal financial system. By contrast, in advanced economies,
nearly all households have such access.
Finally, note that both food and nonfood inflation are higher on average in
emerging economies than in advanced economies. In the former group, food in-
flation is more volatile than nonfood inflation, consistent with the notion that food
prices are more flexible than prices of other goods. Innovations to food price in-
flation are also more volatile than innovations to nonfood inflation. These obser-
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vations are consistent with other evidence that headline inflation is more volatile
than core inflation in both emerging and advanced economies (Anand and Prasad,
2010). The two measures of inflation exhibit a high degree of persistence in both
sets of economies and, contrary to conventional wisdom, food price shocks tend
to be quite persistent in emerging market economies (also see Walsh, 2011).
The main observations from this section are that, relative to households in ad-
vanced economies, those in emerging market economies have a higher share of
food expenditures in total consumption expenditures, a higher income elastic-
ity and lower price elasticity of food expenditures, and significantly lower access
to formal financial institutions. These features potentially have implications for
households’ responses to changes in monetary policy.
2.3 Model
In this section, I develop a small open economy model incorporating features that
are particularly relevant for emerging market economies. To examine whether the
existing results about optimal inflation targeting are affected by these features, I
adopt a model setting that is otherwise standard but broad enough to encompass
features that previous authors have focused on.
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2.3.1 Households
The economy consists of a continuum of infinitely-lived households of two types:
(i) measure λ > 0 of households producing food, the flexible price domestic good
and (ii) measure 1 − λ of households producing a continuum of monopolistically
produced sticky price goods (nonfood) for domestic consumption and a flexible
price good for export (nonfood exports). My model is thus more general than that
of Aoki (2001), which is for a closed economy, and allows for comparisons with
Benigno’s (2004) open economy setting. The model also embeds other key fea-
tures of both Benigno (2004) and Mankiw and Reis (2003), whose models include
multiple sectors with varying degrees of price rigidity.
I assume that labor is immobile across the food and nonfood sectors.1 The rep-
resentative household, denoted by the superscript i, is indexed by f (food sector)
and n (nonfood sector). Household i maximizes the discounted stream of utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[U(Cit,N
i
t )] (2.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The utility function takes the form:
U(Cit,N
i
t ) = u(C
i
t) − vi(N it ), i ∈ { f , n} (2.2)
1This assumption reflects the large inter-sectoral wage differentials in emerging market
economies. Galı´, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2004) demonstrate that, even with free labor mobility,
financial frictions lead to similar results as ours (aggregate demand increasing when the central
bank raises the policy interest rate).
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where u(Cit) is the utility of consumption and vi(N it ) is the disutility of labor supply.
Cit is the composite consumption index of household i in period t, including food
and nonfood goods. It is defined as
Cit =
[
γ
1
η (Cif ,t −C∗)
η−1
η + (1 − γ) 1η (Cin,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(2.3)
where Cif ,t represents food and C
i
n,t is the total nonfood good, comprising both
domestically produced sticky price nonfood goods (Cis,t) and imported nonfood
goods (Cim,t). The composite index is given by
Cin,t =
[
ζ
1
ξ (Cim,t)
ξ−1
ξ + (1 − ζ) 1ξ (Cis,t)
ξ−1
ξ
] ξ
ξ−1
(2.4)
Cis,t is a continuum of the differentiated goods, given by:
Cis,t =
[∫ 1
0
cis,t(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(2.5)
The elasticity of substitution between the flexible price and sticky price goods
is given by η ∈ (0,+∞) and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the weight on food in the consumption in-
dex. ζ ∈ (0, 1) is the share of imported nonfood goods in the nonfood consumption
index, and ξ ∈ (0,+∞) is the elasticity of substitution between domestic nonfood
and imported nonfood goods. θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any
two differentiated goods.
Since food is a necessity, households must consume a minimum amount C∗ of
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food for survival. I assume that all households always have enough income to
buy the subsistence level of food. Even though this constraint does not bind, it
alters the elasticity of substitution between food and nonfood and the marginal
utility of food and nonfood consumption. This is one important departure from
previous models that are mostly relevant for advanced economies, where food is
a modest share of overall household expenditures.
The utility of consumption is given by U(Cit) = (Cit)(1−σ)/(1 − σ), where σ is
the risk aversion factor. The disutility of labor supply for households in the food
sector is given by v f (N
f
t ) = φ
f
n(N
f
t )(1+ψ)/(1+ψ), where the parameter ψ is the inverse
of the Frisch elasticity and φin is the scaling factor. As households in the nonfood
sector provide labor to sticky price firms (s) and export sector firms (x), aggregate
labor supply is given by vn(Nnt ) = φnn[
∫ s
0
N st (m)
1+ψ
1+ψ dm +
∫ 1
s
Nxt (m)
1+ψ
1+ψ dm], where s is the
share of nonfood households that work in the sticky price sector.2
2.3.2 Budget constraints and financial markets
This section highlights the key difference between my model and those of previ-
ous authors who have studied optimal inflation targets. Households in the flexible
price sector (food sector) do not have access to financial markets and they con-
sume their wage income in each period.3 So these households are akin to “rule of
2This specification implies local labor markets for the sticky price and export sectors and perfect
risk-sharing among households in the nonfood sector (Ferrero, Gertler, and Svensson, 2010).
3Data in Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Klapper (2012) show that, in less developed economies, access to
formal financial institutions is at least 10 percentage points lower in rural areas compared to urban
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thumb” consumers.4 A representative household in the food sector maximizes its
lifetime utility given by equation (2.1) subject to the budget constraint:
PtC
f
t + P f ,tC
∗ = W f ,tN
f
t (2.6)
where W f ,t is the nominal wage in the food sector. The total expenditure to attain
a consumption index C ft is given by PtC
f
t where Pt is defined as
Pt =
[
γP1−ηf ,t + (1 − γ)P1−ηn,t
] 1
1−η (2.7)
P f ,t denotes the price of food and Pn,t, the price index of nonfood goods, is
given by
Pn,t =
[
ζP1−ξm,t + (1 − ζ)P1−ξs,t
] 1
1−ξ (2.8)
and Ps,t is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index defined as
Ps,t =
[∫ 1
0
Xt(z)1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
(2.9)
Households in the nonfood sector provide labor to firms in both the sticky
price sector and the export sector. They can buy one-period nominal bonds and
areas. Basu and Srivastava (2005) document that 80 percent of individuals in India’s agricultural
sector have no access to formal finance.
4There is no storage technology in the model. In addition to keeping the model tractable, this
could be seen as reflecting the constraints that rural households in emerging market economies
face in getting access to the formal financial system for both borrowing and saving purposes.
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foreign bonds to smooth their consumption. A representative household in this
sector maximizes lifetime utility given by equation (2.1) subject to the following
budget constraint
PtCnt + P f ,tC
∗ + Bt + etB∗t +
ψB
2 B
∗
t
2
≤ Ws,t
∫ s
0
N st (m)dm + Wx,t
∫ 1
s
N xt (m)dm + Rt−1Bt−1 + etR
∗
t−1B
∗
t−1 + Π
s
t
(2.10)
where Bt and B∗t represents the quantity of one-period nominal risk free discount
bonds denominated in domestic and foreign currency, respectively. The gross
nominal interest rates for those two types of bonds are denoted by Rt and R∗t ,
respectively.5 Wx,t and Ws,t are the nominal wages in the export and sticky price
sectors and N xt and N st are the labor supply in these two sectors. Πst is the profit
from firms in the sticky price sector.
2.3.3 Production
Each household in the food sector owns one firm and produces food using a linear
technology in labor y f ,t = A f ,tN
f
t , subject to a common productivity shock A f ,t.
Firms in this sector are price takers and, given a market price P f ,t, the zero profit
condition determines labor demand.
Similarly, firms in the sticky price sector use a linear technology in labor ys,t(z) =
5I also include a small quadratic portfolio holding cost for foreign bond holdings, as suggested
by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), only to induce stationarity.
50
As,tN st (z) and are subject to a common productivity shock As,t. Following Calvo
(1983), I assume that a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of firms cannot change their price in
each period. Firms that are free to change the price at time t choose a price Xt to
maximize the discounted profit stream given by:
max
Xt(z)
Et
∞∑
j=0
(αβ) jQt,t+ j
[
yst,t+ j(z)(Xt(z) − MC st )
]
(2.11)
where Qt,t+ j is the stochastic discount factor, Xt is the price of the variety produced
by firm z, and yst,t+ j is the output of firm in period t + j when it has set its price in
period t. Furthermore, the marginal cost is given by MC st =
W st
Ast
.
Firms in the export sector also use a linear technology yx,t = Ax,tN xt and face an
exogenous price level every period. Firms in this sector are assumed to be price
takers. Import prices are exogenous and follow the law of one price. The terms
of trade shock, which links import and export prices, determines the export price.
Thus, Px,t = S tPm,t, where S t is the terms of trade. Given export prices, the firms’
cost minimization problem determines wages and, therefore, the labor demand in
the sector.
2.3.4 Inflation and monetary policy rule
Headline inflation is defined as pit = PtPt−1 , gross inflation in the sticky price sector as
pis,t =
Ps,t
Ps,t−1 , and gross imported goods inflation is defined as pim,t =
Pm,t
Pm,t−1 . The steady
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state is characterized by constant prices (zero inflation) and no price stickiness
in the economy. The central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate (Rt)
according to the following version of a Taylor (1993) rule:
log
(Rt
R¯
)
= ρ log
(Rt−1
R¯
)
+ (1 − ρ)
[
φpilog
(
pi∗t
p¯i
)
+ φylog
(
yt
y¯
)]
(2.12)
where y¯, p¯i and R¯ are the steady state values of output, inflation, and the nominal
interest rate, respectively. The term ρ represents the central banker’s preference
for interest rate smoothing. φpi and φy are the weights on inflation and output gap
assigned by the policy makers. Setting the parameter φy = 0 implies strict infla-
tion targeting regimes. I characterize core inflation as the inflation in the sticky
price sector, pis,t, and headline inflation as the overall inflation, pit, for my policy
experiments.
I also compute the optimal inflation target, which maximizes welfare condi-
tional on a given choice of monetary rule and on the specific shocks hitting an
economy. This target could have weights on different components (including im-
ported goods) that are not necessarily the same as their weights in the CPI basket.
I use a quasi-Newton algorithm to search over the parameters ρpis and ρpi f for the
following inflation target to maximize aggregate welfare:
pi∗t = ρpispis,t + ρpi fpi f ,t + (1 − ρpis − ρpi f )pim,t (2.13)
In a model with no food sector, the second term would not appear; in a closed
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economy model, the third term would not appear. In such cases, the weights on
the remaining two terms would have to sum to one.
2.3.5 Exogenous shock processes
I assume that productivity shocks in the food sector follow an AR(1) process.
Firms in the sticky price sector face similar AR(1) productivity shocks but are
also subject to mark-up shocks that reflect rent-seeking behavior that is typical
in emerging market economies. This is a departure from models that only fea-
ture productivity shocks in the relevant sectors. Firms in the export sector face
terms of trade shocks as they are price takers and face international market prices
that are determined exogenously. This shock is similar to a productivity shock to
the production of export goods. The structure of the export sector allows me to
encompass the setup of Frankel (2008). To sum up, there are four shocks in the
model with innovations to each of them drawn from i.i.d. normal distributions,
namely the productivity shock in the food sector, the productivity shock in the
sticky price goods sector, the markup shock in the sticky price goods sector, and
the terms of trade shock in the nonfood export sector:
log
A f ,t
A f
 = ρ fa log A f ,t−1
A f
 + ε ft , ε ft ∼ N(0, σ fa) (2.14)
log
(
As,t
As
)
= ρsalog
(
As,t−1
As
)
+ εst , ε
s
t ∼ N(0, σsa) (2.15)
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log
(
τt
τ
)
= ρτlog
(
τt−1
τ
)
+ ετt , ε
τ
t ∼ N(0, στ) (2.16)
log
(
S t
S
)
= ρslog
(
S t−1
S
)
+ εσt , ε
σ
t ∼ N(0, σs) (2.17)
2.3.6 Welfare evaluations
My objective is to determine the policy rule that yields the highest level of life-
time utility as a weighted sum of households’ welfare, which can be written as
Vtotal = λV
f
t + (1 − λ)Vnt . The second-order accurate consumer welfare measure is
computed under different monetary policy regimes as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004, 2007). Since the prior literature concludes that strict core inflation targeting
is the welfare maximizing policy rule, that is used as the benchmark to evaluate
the welfare gains (or losses) associated with alternative policy regimes. The pa-
rameter ω, the welfare gain from adopting an alternative policy rule, is defined as
the fraction that has to be added to the strict core inflation targeting regime’s (de-
noted by r) consumption process to yield a level of aggregate welfare equivalent
to that under regime a. That is,
Va0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU((1 + ω)Crt ,N
r
t ) (2.18)
A positive value of ω means that welfare is higher under the alternative policy
rule. The welfare gain ω is given by
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ω =
[
Va0 + D
r
0
Vr0 + D
r
0
] 1
1−σ
− 1 (2.19)
where Dr0 = E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t
[
φn
(Nrt )
1+ψ
1+ψ
]
. A value of ω ∗ 100 = 1, represents a gain of one
percentage point of permanent consumption under the alternative policy regime.
2.3.7 Parameter selection
Parameter selection for the model is a challenging task. There is no consensus on
the values of some parameters and those used in the literature are mostly based on
micro data from advanced countries. I pick baseline parameters from the existing
literature and then do extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the choice of
key parameters.
The discount factor β equals 0.99, which amounts to an annual real interest
rate of 4 percent. It is assumed that λ equals 0.4, implying that 40 percent of
households in the economy are credit constrained, consistent with the data in
Table 2.2. The baseline value of the risk aversion parameter σ = 2 is the value
most commonly used in the literature on emerging market economies (Aguiar
and Gopinath, 2007; Devereux, Lane, and Xu, 2006; Garcı´a-Cicco, Pancrazi, and
Uribe, 2010).
Following Basu and Fernald (1995) and Basu (1996), the parameter θ equals 11
(elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods), implying a markup
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of 10 percent in the steady state. The probability that a price does not adjust in
a given period (α) is set at 0.66 (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). This implies
that prices remain fixed for a mean duration of 3 quarters, consistent with the
microeconomic evidence for both emerging and advanced economies.6 The ap-
propriate value of the Frisch elasticity ( 1
ψ
) is both important and controversial. For
my benchmark case it is assumed to be 0.33 (ψ = 3). For the monetary policy pa-
rameters, I follow Galı´, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2004) and Mohanty and Klau
(2005) and choose ρ = 0.7, φpi = 2, and φy = 0.5.
An important feature of emerging countries is the high share of food expen-
diture in total household expenditures. To calibrate the subsistence level food
consumption parameter C∗ and the weight on food in the consumption index γ,
it is assumed that the average expenditure on food is around 42 percent (consis-
tent with household surveys in emerging countries). It is also assumed that on
average one third of households’ steady state food consumption is required for
subsistence, enabling me to match estimates of the income elasticity of food con-
sumption (about two-thirds).7 As the demand for food is inelastic, I set η = 0.6
for the baseline case. Along with the subsistence level of food consumption, this
implies a price elasticity of the demand for food of around -0.3 in the steady state,
which is close to the USDA estimate.
6Evidence from Brazil (Gouvea, 2007), Chile (Medina, Rappoport, and Soto, 2007), Mexico
(Gagnon, 2009), and South Africa (Creamer and Rankin, 2008) indicates that the frequency of price
adjustment is much higher for food than for nonfood products and that price adjustments are less
frequent during periods of low to moderate inflation. Since my model has no trend inflation and
I impose price stickiness only in the nonfood sector, my parameter choice is consistent with the
results of these studies.
7The income elasticity of food consumption is equal to one minus the subsistence ratio.
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The major argument in favor of excluding food from the core price index is
that the shocks to that sector are seasonal and transient. The value of the AR
(1) coefficient of the food sector shock is set at 0.25 (implying that the shock has
low persistence, which seems reasonable given the heavy dependence of agricul-
ture on transitory weather conditions). Following the literature, the value of the
AR(1) coefficient of the nonfood sector shock is set at 0.9 (Aguiar and Gopinath,
2007). The volatility of productivity shocks in emerging countries is higher than
in advanced countries (Pallage and Robe, 2003; Garcı´a-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe,
2010). I set the standard deviation of the food productivity shock σ fa = 0.03 and
the standard deviation of the nonfood productivity shock σsa = 0.02. I follow Dev-
ereux, Lane, and Xu (2006) in calibrating the persistence and standard deviation of
the terms of trade shock and choose ρs = 0.77 and σs = 0.013. I set the persistence
of the mark-up shock ρτ = 0.9 and the standard deviation parameter στ = 0.01.
2.4 Baseline Results
While it is not my objective to match specific moments, the incomplete markets
version of my model more closely matches the properties of business cycle fluc-
tuations in emerging economies relative to advanced economies. For instance,
with the baseline parameters and shock processes, the incomplete markets model
delivers inflation that is more volatile than in the complete markets model. This
is consistent with the empirical findings of Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella (2004),
57
Table 2.3: Parameter Values Used in Chapter 2
Parameter Definition Value
Structural
λ Share of households in the food sector (who are credit-constrained) 0.4
η Elasticity of substitution between food and nonfood 0.6
C∗ Subsistence level of food consumption given subsistence ratio of 1/3 0.042
γ Non-subsistence food consumption share 0.326
General
β Discount factor 0.99
σ Risk aversion coefficient 2
θ Elasticity of substitution between different varieties 11
ψ Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply 3
ψb Interest rate elasticity of debt (for technical reasons only) 0.0007
α Probability of not being able to reset price in each quarter 0.66
ξ Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 0.7
ζ Share of imports in total nonfood consumption 0.3
Policy
ρ Degree of interest rate smoothing 0.7
φpi Degree of response to inflation 2
φy Degree of response to output gap 0.5
Shocks
ρ
f
a , σ
f
a Productivity shocks in the food sector: persistence, std. dev. 0.25, 0.030
ρsa, σsa Productivity shocks in the sticky price sector: persistence, std. dev. 0.90, 0.020
ρs, σs Terms of trade shocks in the export sector: persistence, std. dev. 0.77, 0.013
ρτ, στ Markup shocks in the sticky price sector: persistence, std. dev. 0.90, 0.010
Bowdler and Malik (2005), and Pe´tursson (2008) that emerging economies have
more volatile inflation than advanced ones.8 In my model, the reason for this is
8Please refer to the appendix for more details.
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that, due to lack of risk-sharing and consumption smoothing, the relative price be-
tween food and sticky price nonfood goods tends to be more volatile, rendering
overall inflation also more volatile. Consumption is more volatile in the incom-
plete markets model, matching the findings of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and
Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009) that consumption is more volatile in emerging
economies than in advanced economies.
I now present the conditional welfare gains associated with different policy
rules in my model. I include all four shocks–productivity shocks to two sectors,
mark-up shocks, and terms of trade shocks–when conducting the welfare calcula-
tions discussed below.
Table 2.4 shows the welfare comparisons from targeting different price indices
under complete and incomplete market settings, and also the sectoral weights for
constructing the optimal price index in each case. With complete markets, the
optimal price index puts the entire weight on the sticky price sector, with zero
weights on food and traded goods, making it identical to core inflation targeting.
Targeting headline inflation slightly reduces welfare. Thus, under complete mar-
kets, the choice of targeting strict core inflation is the best policy and dominates
targeting of broader price indexes, as in Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004).
However, with incomplete markets, this result no longer holds. The second
row of Table 2.4 shows that headline inflation targeting is now welfare improv-
ing relative to core inflation targeting. Targeting the optimal price index yields a
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Table 2.4: Welfare Comparisons under Different Inflation Targets
Scenario
Welfare Gain Weights in the Optimal Price Index
Headline Optimal Food Prices Sticky Prices Import Prices
Complete markets -0.09% 0.00% 0.00 1.00 0.00
Incomplete markets (baseline) 0.16% 0.20% 0.35 0.65 0.00
No food sector -0.05% 0.00% NA 1.00 0.00
No markup shocks 0.16% 0.20% 0.36 0.64 0.00
No food subsistence level -0.07% 0.00% 0.08 0.92 0.00
Flexible headline vs core 0.12% 0.17% 0.34 0.66 0.00
Notes: The optimal price index comprises food prices, sticky nonfood domestic goods
prices, and import prices. Welfare gains under alternative inflation targets are derived as
permanent consumption gains relative to strict core inflation targeting. The third, fourth,
and fifth rows show results when I introduce one deviation at a time from the baseline in-
complete markets model. The last row compares flexible headline inflation targeting versus
flexible core inflation targeting, where both rules include a positive weight on the output
gap.
slightly higher welfare gain than targeting headline inflation.9 The optimal price
index assigns a weight of two-thirds to the sticky price sector and one-third to
food prices. This result is a marked departure from the prior literature based on
complete markets, wherein the optimal weight on food prices would be zero. On
the other hand, it is consistent with the Benigno (2004) result (and, implicitly, the
9The welfare gains are larger than those typically reported in models calibrated to advanced
economy data. One reason is that emerging economies have more volatile output and consump-
tion than advanced economies. Secondly, the financial frictions that I include in my model im-
ply that monetary policy can have an even greater impact in terms of reducing the consumption
volatility of different household types, which can in some cases be higher than aggregate con-
sumption volatility.
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results of Aoki, 2001, and Mankiw and Reis, 2003) that the weight on the traded
goods sector is zero. That sector has flexible prices and agents in that sector have
access to financial markets, so the classical result is confirmed.
To investigate these results more carefully, I analyze the responses of key vari-
ables to a food productivity shock because shocks to that sector highlight the rel-
evance of market completeness. Figure 2.1 plots the impulse responses of various
macroeconomic variables to a one percent negative food productivity shock un-
der complete markets. Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage
deviation from its steady state level. Impulse responses under a strict core in-
flation targeting rule are shown by the solid lines. The dashed lines are impulse
responses under a strict headline inflation targeting rule. The strict headline in-
flation targeting regime results in a slightly higher volatility of consumption and
output. Also, the policy response is more aggressive under strict headline infla-
tion targeting, which leads to a further decline in output. These results are similar
to those documented in the existing literature on inflation targeting.
Following an increase in inflation, the central bank raises interest rates, reduc-
ing aggregate demand (as consumers postpone their consumption following an
increase in interest rates) and, thus, inflation. So, under complete markets, stabi-
lizing core inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the output gap (Aoki, 2001) and
there are no additional welfare gains from adopting headline inflation targeting.
Thus, core inflation targeting is the welfare maximizing policy choice for the cen-
tral bank.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse Responses to a Negative Food Productivity Shock (Complete
Markets)
Notes: The impulse responses shown above are to a one percent negative shock to food
productivity. Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its
steady state level.
However, in the presence of credit constrained consumers, headline inflation
targeting appears to be a better policy choice. Figure 2.2 plots the impulse re-
sponses of various macroeconomic variables to a one percent negative food pro-
ductivity shock under incomplete markets. Aggregate demand responds differ-
ently to monetary tightening under strict core inflation targeting and headline
inflation targeting. The central bank is now able to effectively control aggregate
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Responses to a Negative Food Productivity Shock (Incomplete
Markets)
Notes: The impulse responses shown above are to a one percent negative shock to food
productivity. Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its
steady state level.
demand by increasing interest rates only when it targets headline inflation. Ag-
gregate demand, instead of going up slightly, goes up sharply in response to the
shock if the central bank follows strict core inflation targeting. Thus, headline
inflation targeting outperforms core inflation targeting as the former is more ef-
fective at stabilizing output.
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In order to examine the mechanics behind this result, I look at the proper-
ties of aggregate demand under incomplete markets. In the presence of financial
frictions, the consumption choices of different households vary (as opposed to
complete markets, where the consumption choice of each household is identical).
While the consumption demand of unconstrained households is responsive to in-
terest rates (as they optimize intertemporally), the consumption demand of credit-
constrained households is independent of interest rate changes and depends only
on their current period wage income. Since only a fraction of aggregate demand is
influenced by interest rate changes, a monetary tightening does not automatically
mitigate the increase in aggregate demand. The response of aggregate demand
crucially depends on the behavior of credit-constrained households.
Figure 2.2 shows that, following a negative shock to food productivity, the cen-
tral bank raises the interest rate, lowering the demand of unconstrained house-
holds (as it is optimal for them to postpone consumption). However, it has no
bearing on the demand of credit-constrained consumers. An increase in the rela-
tive price of food following a negative food productivity shock increases the wage
income and, therefore, consumption demand of credit-constrained households.
Thus, the demand of the two types of households moves in opposite directions
following a negative shock to food productivity.
Which of the two demands dominates is determined by the policy regime. Un-
der core inflation targeting, the increase in food prices (and, therefore, the wage
income of food sector households) is higher than under headline inflation tar-
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geting. This higher wage income translates into higher consumption demand by
credit-constrained consumers (who consume all of their current wage income),
more than compensating for the lower consumption demand of unconstrained
consumers. Consequently, aggregate demand rises. By contrast, when the cen-
tral bank targets headline inflation, price increases in the food sector are lower
and the rise in income and, therefore, the increase in consumption demand in that
sector is smaller. Thus, monetary intervention is effective in achieving its objec-
tive of controlling aggregate demand only when the central bank targets headline
inflation.
To formalize the above arguments, I examine the log-linearized aggregate de-
mand equation, which is given by:10
cˆt = − (1 − λ)ζs
σ
Et(Rˆt − pˆit+1) + Etcˆt+1 − λζ fEt∆cˆ f ,t+1 (2.20)
where ζ f =
C¯ f
C¯ is the steady state share of food sector households’ consumption
and ζs = C¯sC¯ is the steady state share of nonfood sector households’ consumption.
Furthermore, from the optimal labor supply of food sector households, I have:
cˆ f ,t =
1 + a
ψ
1 + aσ
ψ
xˆ f ,t +
a(1 + 1
ψ
)
1 + aσ
ψ
Aˆ f ,t (2.21)
where a = x¯ f y¯xC¯ f > 1.
10Aggregate demand is the sum of the log-linearized consumption demand of households in the
two sectors. Variables with a hat denote log deviations from corresponding steady state values.
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Equations (2.20) and (2.21) suggest that, in the presence of credit-constrained
consumers, there is a link between aggregate demand and the relative price of
food (x f ,t). In this setting, relative prices affect aggregate demand in addition to
aggregate supply. Thus, the presence of financial frictions implies that manag-
ing aggregate demand requires the central bank to choose a policy regime that
would limit the rise in wages of credit-constrained consumers (and, therefore, the
increase in their demand).
I now present a series of variants of my benchmark model to investigate which
features are quantitatively most important in driving the results. In the third row
of Table 2.4, I consider a model without a food sector. The economy now has one
sticky price sector while import prices are flexible. Core inflation targeting is now
better than headline inflation targeting (which would have a positive weight on
import prices), confirming the classical result of Aoki (2001). The optimal price
index assigns a weight of zero to import prices, consistent with Benigno (2004)
and indicating that openness of the economy is not crucial to the results.
In the fourth row of Table 2.4, I consider a variant of the baseline model with
no markup shocks. When the economy is only hit by productivity and terms
of trade shocks, it is still the case that the welfare gains from targeting headline
inflation rather than core inflation are positive. The parameters in the optimal
price index are also almost identical to those in the baseline case. Thus, unlike
in the complete markets setting of Mankiw and Reis (2003), I find that markup
shocks do not matter greatly in determining the right price index to target.
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In the fifth row of Table 2.4, I evaluate the importance of the assumption of a
subsistence level of food consumption. As noted earlier, this assumption affects
the elasticity of substitution between food and nonfood goods. When I drop this
assumption, targeting headline inflation leads to lower welfare than targeting core
inflation. The intuition for this result is that, with perfect substitutability between
food and nonfood, agents in the economy simply alter their consumption in re-
sponse to a change in relative prices when there is a sector-specific productivity
shock.
Thus, my main result is that the combination of incomplete financial markets
and a subsistence level of food consumption, which are both characteristics rel-
evant to emerging economies, makes it optimal for an inflation-targeting central
bank to target headline rather than core inflation.
Next, I evaluate more practical monetary policy rules employed even by infla-
tion targeting central banks, which typically include the output gap. The results
in the last row of Table 2.4 show that flexible headline inflation targeting delivers
better welfare outcomes than flexible core inflation targeting. This is true whether
the price index in headline inflation targeting is based on CPI weights or the opti-
mal price index. The weight on food, nonfood, and imported goods in the optimal
price index is essentially the same as under strict headline inflation targeting.
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2.5 Sensitivity Analysis and Extensions
In this section, I report results from a variety of experiments to test the robustness
of my results to changes in the values of key parameters and certain aspects of
the structure of the model. My results held up quite well to changes in values of
most parameters, so in the discussion below I focus on the elements of my model
that represent significant deviations from the prior literature. It should be noted
that, since the steady state values of the models differ, it is only possible to make
a comparison across regimes and not across different models.
2.5.1 Sensitivity to key parameters
One of the key parameter settings in the model is the proportion of households in
the economy that are in the food sector and face credit constraints. As the share
of households in this sector rises, welfare gains from headline inflation or optimal
inflation targeting decline relative to core inflation targeting (see Table 2.5, Panel
A). This might seem counter-intuitive as these households lack access to credit.
The mechanism for this result is as follows. When the share of rural households is
larger, under my parameter assumptions they will be poorer on average while the
nonfood sector households will be richer. For a given drop in agricultural output,
the relative price of food goes up by less when the consumption of food (above
the subsistence level) by nonfood sector households is larger. When the share of
rural households is small, the food consumption of households in the nonfood
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sector is also small in the steady state. Therefore, to accommodate a drop in food
production, the relative price responds sharply.11
An important assumption in the model is the subsistence level of food. As
noted earlier, this constraint does not bind in equilibrium but reduces the elastic-
ity of substitution between food and nonfood goods. As shown in Table 2.4, when
there is no subsistence level of food consumption, the weight of food in the op-
timal inflation target is small and core inflation targeting actually delivers higher
welfare than headline inflation. As the subsistence level goes up, the weight of
food in the optimal inflation index rises and core inflation targeting becomes infe-
rior to headline inflation targeting (see Table 2.5, Panel B). Note that in my model
the total share of food consumption is pinned down based on empirical estimates
for emerging economies. A higher subsistence level of food therefore implies a
lower level of nonsubsistence food consumption. Therefore, for any given amount
of drop in the food output, market clearing necessitates a larger increase in the
relative price of food. As a result, the higher is the subsistence level of food, the
more volatile the impulse responses will be and the larger the welfare gain from
headline inflation targeting.
An alternative approach to including a subsistence level of food in the util-
ity function would be to directly pick a lower value for the elasticity of substitu-
tion between food and nonfood goods. Dropping the assumption that there is a
11Reducing the share of food sector households even further leads to implausibly large welfare
gains, but this is because I have pinned down the average share of food expenditures in total
household expenditures to be 0.42. Economies with small shares of rural households tend to be
richer economies with substantially lower food shares in total expenditure.
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Table 2.5: Sensitivity Tests
Parameter Welfare Gain Weights in the Optimal Price Index
Value Headline Optimal Food Prices Sticky Prices Import Prices
A. Share of Rural Households (baseline = 0.4)
0.3 0.36% 0.49% 0.87 0.13 0.00
0.4 0.16% 0.20% 0.35 0.65 0.00
0.5 -0.02% 0.09% 0.22 0.78 0.00
0.6 -0.15% 0.04% 0.14 0.86 0.00
B. Subsistence Ratio of Food (baseline = 0.33)
0.0 -0.07% 0.00% 0.08 0.92 0.00
0.1 -0.06% 0.01% 0.14 0.86 0.00
0.2 -0.03% 0.03% 0.21 0.79 0.00
0.3 0.08% 0.12% 0.31 0.69 0.00
0.4 0.56% 0.63% 0.48 0.52 0.00
C. Price Stickiness (baseline = 0.66)
0.5 0.13% 0.16% 0.42 0.58 0.00
0.6 0.16% 0.19% 0.39 0.61 0.00
0.7 0.14% 0.19% 0.32 0.68 0.00
0.8 0.01% 0.11% 0.20 0.80 0.00
D. Financial Frictions (baseline = no access to domestic bonds)
Full access to bonds -0.08% 0.00% 0.01 0.99 0.00
Moderate frictions 0.02% 0.08% 0.24 0.76 0.00
Strong frictions 0.13% 0.17% 0.34 0.66 0.00
Notes: The optimal price index comprises food prices, sticky nonfood domestic
goods prices, and import prices. Welfare gains under different parameter values
are derived as permanent consumption gains relative to strict core inflation tar-
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subsistence level of food and lowering the elasticity to 0.38 yielded results simi-
lar to my baseline results. However, my approach is more realistic for emerging
economies. Empirical evidence shows that the income elasticity of food consump-
tion is smaller than one in emerging economies, which suggests it is more likely
that food consumption is driven by the subsistence level.12
Another crucial parameter in the model is the share of food in total household
consumption expenditures. When this share is small, the optimal inflation target
puts most of the weight on the sticky price sector. Core inflation targeting then
delivers higher welfare than headline inflation targeting, and the gains from tar-
geting the optimal inflation index are modest. As the food share rises, the optimal
inflation index involves an increasing weight on food prices. When food accounts
for half of total consumption expenditures on average, the gains from headline
inflation targeting become large and the optimal inflation index puts nearly the
entire weight on food prices. This result appears at odds with one of the results in
Mankiw and Reis (2003). They find that “the more important a price is in the con-
sumer price index, the less weight that sector’s price should receive in the stability
price index.” The incomplete markets structure of my model and the low elastic-
ity of substitution between food and nonfood goods accounts for the difference
between my result and theirs. However, my result that the weight on food prices
is zero is true when markets are complete irrespective of the share of food in con-
sumption expenditures, consistent with a different proposition in their paper–that
12See Anand and Prasad (2010) for more discussion. As noted earlier, the income elasticity of
food consumption is equal to one minus the subsistence ratio so the model without subsistence
level assumption cannot match the data for emerging countries.
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sectors with more flexible prices should get a lower weight.
I also experimented with changing the degree of price rigidity in the sticky
price sector (see Table 2.5, Panel C). Consistent with Mankiw and Reis (2003) and
Benigno (2004), the weight of the sticky price sector in the optimal price index
increases with the degree of price stickiness. As the degree of price stickiness
increases, the optimal price index converges to core inflation, so the gains from
either headline or optimal inflation targeting (relative to core inflation targeting)
start to fall when prices are highly rigid.
2.5.2 Financial frictions
In the baseline model, it is assumed that food sector households face strong finan-
cial frictions, turning them into hand-to-mouth consumers. I now relax this as-
sumption by introducing a portfolio holding cost for these households, enabling
me to vary the extent of (common) financial frictions they face (see Table 2.5, Panel
D). When the portfolio holding cost is zero, rural households have the same de-
gree of access to the bond market as nonfood sector households. It is important
to note that this is not equivalent to having complete financial markets. When
the portfolio holding cost is very high, rural households hold zero bonds and the
economy converges to the baseline incomplete markets case.
In the full access (but still not complete markets) scenario, food prices do enter
with a nonzero weight in the optimal price index, although this weight is sub-
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stantially smaller than in the baseline incomplete markets scenario. However, the
welfare gain from targeting the optimal price index is small relative to core in-
flation targeting as the bonds give food sector households the ability to smooth
consumption intertemporally although they cannot fully insure against sector-
specific shocks. As the financial frictions become stronger, the welfare gains from
headline inflation targeting rise and the share of food prices in the optimal price
index also increases.
2.5.3 Common productivity shocks
Next, consider the case where there are only aggregate rather than sector-specific
productivity shocks.13 To this point, I have focused on the impact of a shock to
productivity in the flexible price sector as it most clearly illustrates the point about
what monetary policy rule is better in response to a shock to the flexible price part
of the economy. Of course, while the impulse responses highlight different mod-
els’ responses to only a food productivity shock, the simulation results include all
shocks.
I recomputed the model with a productivity shock common to the food and
the nonfood domestic goods sectors (and, as before, markup and terms of trade
shocks as well). Intuitively, this should preserve the welfare gain from targeting
inflation in the headline CPI or the optimal price index as there are no longer any
13Please refer to the appendix for more details of the results discussed in this subsection and the
next one.
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shocks specific to the rigid price sector. This is indeed what I find, confirming my
main results. The results go through whether the common productivity shock is
transitory (food sector shock) or more persistent (sticky price sector shock). Be-
sides, food prices consistently have a significant weight in the optimal inflation
target.
2.5.4 Fiscal policy interventions
Since incomplete financial markets are important for driving my results, an im-
portant question from a policy perspective is whether other policy tools could
be used to promote risk-sharing, improve welfare outcomes, and alter the rela-
tive merits of headline versus core inflation targeting. One obvious candidate is a
state-dependent redistribution between households in the food and nonfood sec-
tors through the tax and transfer system.
Consider, for instance, a food tax whose revenues are distributed across all
households in a lump sum fashion. A food tax would lead to a larger redistribu-
tion from food sector households to other households when the economy is hit by
a shock that drives up the price of food. This would result in a smaller change
in the relative price of food compared to my baseline model. I conducted some
numerical experiments showing that, as the food tax increased (up to a certain
level), the economy approached the complete markets benchmark, with smaller
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gains from headline inflation targeting relative to core inflation targeting.14
In short, in lieu of headline inflation targeting, fiscal policy interventions can be
used to complete markets and improve welfare in an emerging market economy
with incomplete financial markets and a subsistence level of food consumption.
Targeting transfers in this fashion might be challenging for an emerging market
economy, due to political economy constraints and governance problems. Never-
theless, I recognize that this is an important topic for future research.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
Previous research has concluded that optimal monetary policy should focus on
offsetting nominal rigidities by stabilizing core inflation. However, those results
rely on the assumption that markets are complete and that price stickiness is the
only source of distortion in the economy. In this chapter, I have developed a
more realistic model for emerging market economies that has the following key
features–incomplete markets with credit-constrained consumers; households re-
quiring a minimum subsistence level of food; low price elasticity of the demand
for food; and a high share of expenditure on food in households’ total consump-
tion expenditure. I nest models such as those of Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004)
14I get the symmetric result that food price subsidies can increase relative price volatility and
improve the benefits from headline rather than core inflation targeting. The reason is that these
subsidies would result in a net transfer from nonfood sector households to food sector households
exactly when the relative price of food rises.
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as special cases of my model.
I show that the classical result about the optimality of core inflation targeting
can be overturned by introducing financial frictions. In the presence of credit-
constrained consumers, targeting core inflation no longer maximizes welfare.
Moreover, stabilizing inflation is not sufficient to stabilize output when markets
are not complete. Under these conditions, headline inflation targeting improves
welfare. My model also allows me to compute optimal price indexes that maxi-
mize welfare. The optimal price index includes a positive weight on food prices
but, unlike headline inflation, generally assigns zero weight to import prices. This
is because agents in that sector have access to financial markets and, unlike in the
case of food, the price elasticity of the demand for goods produced in this sector
is high.15 A technical point to bear in mind is that, in the absence of aggregate
homothetic preferences, it may no longer be optimal for monetary policy to target
a particular price index. But my concern in this chapter is about a practical choice
that inflation targeting central banks face, which is typically to target an aggregate
price index.
One possible extension of my model is to include money explicitly. While
this provides a saving mechanism for hand-to-mouth consumers, it would also
strengthen the case for headline inflation targeting to preserve the value of mon-
etary savings. Another extension would be to explore how fiscal policy tools,
15Looking beyond the CPI, Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) find that in the presence of wage
stickiness optimal monetary policy should target the nominal wage. Reinterpreting the sectors in
the Mankiw-Reis (2003) model as including a labor sector with nominal wage rigidities yields
similar results.
76
such as food price subsidies that affect the relative price of food as well as spe-
cific state-contingent redistributive mechanisms, could be used to improve wel-
fare even with incomplete financial markets. In emerging market economies, such
tools could be especially useful but are also more likely to be beset by problems in
governance and implementation.
In future work, it will also be important to more explicitly consider the effects
of particular inflation targeting rules on income distribution. For a normative
analysis of optimal policies, distributional effects could be of first order impor-
tance in emerging market economies.16 Another extension would be to include
physical capital in the model. This highlights a practical dilemma that emerging
market central banks often grapple with in pursuit of their objective of price sta-
bility. For instance, raising policy rates to deal with surging food price inflation
can hurt industrial activity. While raising interest rates in response to a transitory
negative shock to agricultural sector productivity might seem counter-intuitive,
my results suggest that such a policy could in fact be welfare improving in an in-
complete markets setting in which food consumption accounts for a large share of
household consumption expenditures.
16See Prasad (2014) for a discussion.
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CHAPTER 3
INTER-SECTORAL DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY
IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES
3.1 Introduction
The Balassa-Samuelson theory suggests that countries will experience real ex-
change rate appreciation when productivity growth in their tradable sectors
is high. Since currency appreciation will hurt export competitiveness, central
bankers in emerging market economies often attempt to limit nominal exchange
rate appreciation. Some try to peg their currencies to the dollar, while many others
adopt a policy of “leaning against the wind” to limit what they view as excessive
exchange rate volatility. This happens when a central bank responds not only to
inflation but also to nominal exchange rate fluctuations.
While many have tried to study monetary policy in the open economy setting,
few have looked at the distributional consequences of different monetary policy
rules. In this chapter, I focus on a specific contemporary policy issue mentioned
above: nominal exchange rate management. I try to understand the distributional
consequences when an emerging market central bank, motivated by concerns over
export competitiveness, chooses to manage its nominal exchange rate and keeps
it from appreciating.
This policy choice has significant distributional consequences, particularly on
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account of financial frictions and household heterogeneity in emerging market
economies. Incomplete financial markets, coupled with insufficient access to for-
mal financial institutions, limit households’ ability to insure against household-
specific or sector-specific shocks and magnify the distributional effects of aggre-
gate macroeconomic fluctuations that may initially have only small effects.
Central banks use monetary policy to maintain export competitiveness when
the interests of households in the tradable sector are given prominence–perhaps
for political-economic reasons related to protecting jobs in that sector. A policy
attempting to keep the nominal exchange rate stable can help stabilize relative
prices and temporarily increase consumption by workers in this sector. However,
this policy tends to be more inflation-tolerant and can have negative consequences
for workers in the nontradable sector. It could even reduce aggregate welfare.
To analyze the distributional effects of such policy practices, I develop a the-
oretical model that allows me to simultaneously evaluate the aggregate and dis-
tributional effects of various monetary policy rules in a small open economy set-
ting. The features that I incorporate into the model make it especially relevant
for the analysis of monetary policy in emerging market economies. The main fea-
tures include heterogeneous households, incomplete financial markets, and two
sectors–tradable and nontradable goods. While tradable goods prices are set in
international markets, nontradable goods prices are sticky.1
1Although my analysis focuses on middle-income emerging market economies, the features
noted here and the results reported in the chapter apply equally, if not more forcefully, to low-
income developing economies.
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I find that nominal exchange rate management in response to positive produc-
tivity shocks in the tradable sector does indeed temporarily improve household
consumption in that sector, which means that maintaining export competitive-
ness by monetary policy is feasible in the short run. This benefit comes, however,
at the expense of lower consumption levels for households in the nontradable
sector. Interestingly, I find that these effects are reversed under the welfare cri-
terion. Nominal exchange rate management increases the volatility of household
consumption in the tradable sector, thus reducing their welfare level. Moreover,
when a central bank attempts to stabilize the nominal exchange rate in response
to other shocks–such as productivity shocks in the nontraded goods sector or for-
eign interest rate shocks–the households in the tradable sector and the aggregate
economy are negatively affected in terms of both temporary consumption losses
and welfare levels.
Extended versions of the model enable me to consider the effects of various
monetary policy rules against the background of a broader range of other policy
settings. In the presence of capital controls, exchange rate management can de-
liver even sharper temporary consumption benefits to households in the tradable
sector relative to inflation targeting, given positive productivity shocks in the trad-
able sector. But welfare costs for these households also rise on account of higher
consumption volatility. Flexible inflation targeting, which incorporates a measure
of the output gap in the monetary policy rule, leads to similar results. I also find
that fiscal policy, through a set of targeted taxes and transfers, can more efficiently
achieve similar distributional effects that are similar to those under exchange rate
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management.
3.1.1 Related literature
My work builds on three existing strands of research: models of the distribu-
tional effects of monetary policy and heterogeneous agent, the new open economy
macroeconomics, and macroeconomics models for emerging market economies.
Interest in the distributional effects of monetary policy has been revived by a
handful of important new papers. In an early contribution, Romer and Romer
(1999) document that inflation and macroeconomic instability are correlated with
increases in inequality. In a recent paper, Doepke, Schneider, and Selezneva (2015)
analyze the channels through which inflation affects distribution. Meanwhile,
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) tackle the issue from the aspect of financial
institutions and show how monetary policy has distributional effects by affecting
interest rates and the yield curve.
To study distributional effects, it is important to include heterogeneity across
households in my model. One approach is to introduce idiosyncratic labor income
shocks as in Krusell and Smith (1998). However, given the focus of this chapter, I
favor an alternative approach to modeling heterogeneity that divides households
into a few groups. For example, the differentiating factor can be the assumption of
differential access to financial markets, as in Galı´, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2004).
Other papers using a similar framework include Bilbiie (2008).
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The strand of literature discussed above focuses mainly on closed economies
in theoretical work and on the U.S. and other advanced economies in empirical
work. My contribution is to extend this work to a small open economy setting
that is relevant to emerging markets and to assess both the distributional and
aggregate effects of various monetary policies in such economies.
The new open economy macroeconomics literature serves as my modeling
foundation. Recent examples of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) framework I employ in this chapter can be found in Clarida, Galı´, and
Gertler (2002).2 In particular, I adapt the modeling framework of Galı´ and Mona-
celli (2005, 2008), who develop a small open economy model with nominal rigidi-
ties. Engel (2011) shows that optimal policy targets CPI inflation, the output gap,
and currency misalignment. The instrument rule derived in that setup does not
include either the output gap or the measure of currency misalignment. In a small
open economy setting, Kollmann (2002) and Leitemo and So¨derstro¨m (2005) con-
clude that there is no welfare gain from augmenting the monetary policy reaction
function with an exchange rate variable. However, there is considerable evidence
that, in practice, emerging markets do incorporate exchange rate considerations in
their monetary policy formulations. For instance, Mohanty and Klau (2005) find
that, in most emerging market economies, the interest rate responds strongly to
the exchange rate. Fro¨mmel, Garabedian, and Schobert (2011) document that cen-
tral banks in Eastern Europe respond to exchange rate fluctuations. The same re-
2Other important early papers in the literature on which I build include Benigno and Benigno
(2003), Devereux and Engel (2003), Benigno (2004), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), and Sutherland
(2005).
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sult holds even for advanced but highly open economies. Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007) conclude, for example, that the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England
take account of the nominal exchange rate in their policy reactions.
Another important strand within the new open economy macroeconomics
literature is work on emerging market economies. For instance, Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) suggest that emerging market economies face large nonstation-
ary productivity shocks so that growth trend fluctuations constitute their business
cycles. Garcı´a-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010) use a small open economy with
financial frictions to characterize business cycles in emerging markets. Devereux,
Lane, and Xu (2006) compare alternative monetary policies with high and low ex-
change rate pass-through. Liu and Spiegel (2015) study optimal monetary policy
and capital account restrictions in a small open economy.
Both of these strands of the existing literature on open economies have tended
to focus on aggregate welfare effects rather than distributional consequences.
My contribution relative to this literature is to study distributional effects rather
than only aggregate welfare consequences of monetary policy. This highlights
a key point of departure of my modeling framework compared with above-cited
studies–the presence of financial frictions. Financial market incompleteness is cru-
cial for generating distributional effects. Interaction between nominal rigidities
and financial frictions plays a key role in my modeling framework.3
3In recent work that is related to ours, Anand, Prasad, and Zhang (2015) develop a DSGE model
that features a food sector and incomplete financial markets to determine the measure of inflation
a developing economy central bank should target.
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3.2 Exchange Rate Dynamics in Periods of High Tradable-sector
Growth
Fast-growing emerging market economies often encounter appreciation pressure
on their currencies. The traditional Balassa-Samuelson theory suggests that coun-
tries will experience real exchange rate appreciation when productivity growth
in their tradable sectors is high. As a result, emerging market economies with
booming export sectors will gradually lose their competitiveness due to currency
appreciation, which is undesirable in the eyes of policy makers.
Naturally, policy makers would like to slow currency appreciation to main-
tain export competitiveness. There has been plenty of anecdotal evidence sug-
gesting that emerging market economies actively manage their exchange rates.
The implementation can take any of several forms, ranging from hard pegs to
an inflation-targeting monetary policy regime that also responds to exchange rate
fluctuations. The question is whether I have empirical evidence demonstrating
that emerging market economies indeed try to keep their currencies from appre-
ciating in periods of high tradable-sector growth.
In this section, I construct a cross-country dataset to formally assess this ar-
gument. I retrieve data on industrial production, official exchange rates, and in-
flation rates from 53 developing countries dating to 1970. The data source is the
International Financial Statistics database maintained by the International Mone-
tary Fund. I use industrial production growth to proxy tradable-sector growth. I
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construct the CPI-based bilateral real exchange rate between a developing coun-
try and the United States to capture changes in real exchange rates. There are
two reasons I prefer this bilateral real exchange rate. First, data on real effective
exchange rates have been unavailable for many developing countries until very
recently. Second, the bilateral exchange rate with the United States is often the
most important one for many developing countries.
Finally, I need to identify periods of high tradable-sector growth to analyze the
movement of nominal and real exchange rates. I borrow the concept of growth ac-
celerations from Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005). In their original paper,
they study periods in which GDP growth is high in absolute terms and higher
than the historical average, and define those periods as episodes of growth ac-
celeration. I apply their criteria to growth in industrial production, a proxy for
tradable-sector growth.
There are two major criteria for selecting episodes of high tradable-sector
growth:
1. The average growth in industrial production is higher than g¯ for K periods, namely
gIPt,t+K > g¯.
2. The difference between the K-period growth rate and the historical average is larger
than g˜, namely gIPt,t+K − gIP1,t−1 > g˜.
I borrow the parameter values used in Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005)
and set g¯ = 3.5%, g˜ = 2%, and K = 8. In addition, I impose two additional re-
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quirements to avoid over-counting episodes. First, the economy must be growing
above the historical maximum level, which excludes recovery periods after crises.
Second, the start year of an episode must be at least three years away from the start
year of another episode, which minimizes the chance of double-counting one long
episode multiple times. In total, I find 41 episodes of high tradable-sector growth.
At last, I set the year that immediately precedes the high-growth episode as
period 0 and normalize the nominal and real exchange rates in period 0 as 100. I
then transform exchange rates in other periods against the period-0 values such
that values higher than 100 mean depreciation against the period-0 exchange rate.
I compute the median paths of nominal and real exchange rates across countries as
well as the area of realizations between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile.
The results are summarized in Figure 3.1.
The two charts in Figure 3.1 indicate that, in periods of high tradable-sector
growth, nominal exchange rates remain fairly stable and even slightly depreciate
against the period-0 level. On the contrary, real exchange rates remain flat for
the first two years and start to appreciate sharply in the following years. This re-
sult suggests that emerging market economies are indeed reluctant to allow their
currencies to appreciate. However, even without nominal appreciation, the real
exchange rate appreciation predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson theory will ulti-
mately happen when domestic inflation picks up.
In conclusion, emerging market central banks can use monetary policy to pre-
vent nominal appreciation and maintain export competitiveness in the short run;
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Figure 3.1: Exchange Rate Dynamics in Periods of High Tradable-sector Growth
Notes: This figure shows the dynamics of nominal and real exchange rates in periods of
high tradable-sector growth across countries. The solid blue lines are the median paths
of nominal and real exchange rates relative to period 0. The period-0 exchange rates are
normalized to 100, and values higher than 100 mean depreciation against the period-0
exchange rate. The grey area represents the paths of exchange rates between the 25th per-
centile and the 75th percentile. The two charts indicate that, in periods of high tradable-
sector growth, nominal exchange rates remain fairly stable but real exchange rates appre-
ciate sharply.
however, real appreciation will occur gradually due to rising domestic inflation.
Recognizing that an emerging market central bank, motivated by concerns over
export competitiveness, is likely to use monetary policy to stabilize nominal ex-
change rates, it is natural to explore the aggregate and distributional effects, which
I will do in the next few sections.
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3.3 Model
In this section, I develop a small open economy model with features that are rel-
evant to emerging market economies and use it to study the distributional effects
of nominal exchange rate management. I sketch the main features of the model
here, deferring a more detailed description of the model and derivations of key
equations to the appendix.
3.3.1 Households
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of infinitely lived households. There
are two types of households: (i) measure λ > 0 of households work in the trad-
able sector, and (ii) measure 1 − λ of households work in the nontradable sector.
Prices of tradable goods are flexible and set in the foreign currency, determined
in international markets, and taken as given from the home economy’s point of
view. Prices of nontradable goods are set by monopolistically competitive firms,
denominated in the domestic currency, and sticky.
I assume that labor is immobile across the tradable and nontradable sectors.4
The representative household is denoted by the superscript i, and indexed by T
4This assumption reflects the large inter-sectoral wage differentials in emerging market
economies. Artuc¸, Lederman, and Porto (2013) present estimates of labor mobility costs in de-
veloping countries and document that the costs of adjustment to trade shocks are high in these
economies, restricting inter-sectoral labor mobility. Lee and Wolpin (2006) find that, even in ad-
vanced economies, there are large costs for labor to move across sectors.
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(tradable sector) and N (nontradable sector) respectively. Household i maximizes
the discounted stream of utility:
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[U(Cit, L
i
t)] (3.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, Cit is the composite consumption index of
household i in period t, including tradable and nontradable goods, and Lit is the
labor supplied by household i. The utility function takes the form:
U(Cit, L
i
t) =
Cit
1−σ
1 − σ − φi
Lit
1+ψ
1 + ψ
, i ∈ {T,N} (3.2)
where σ is the risk-aversion coefficient, the parameter ψ is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity, and φi is the scaling factor. The consumption index is defined as
Cit =
[
b
1
ξ
(
CiT,t
) ξ−1
ξ
+ (1 − b) 1ξ
(
CiN,t
) ξ−1
ξ
] ξ
ξ−1
(3.3)
where CiT,t represents tradable goods and C
i
N,t represents nontradable goods. The
elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods is given by
ξ ∈ (0,+∞) and b ∈ (0, 1) is the weight on tradable goods in the consumption
index. The composite tradable good CiT,t comprises both domestically produced
and imported tradable goods (CiH,t and C
i
F,t,respectively) and is given by
CiT,t =
[
a
1
η
(
CiH,t
) η−1
η
+ (1 − a) 1η (CiF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(3.4)
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The parameter a ∈ (0, 1) denotes the share of domestically produced goods in
the tradable goods consumption index, and η ∈ (0,+∞) is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between domestically produced and imported tradable goods. The composite
nontradable good CiN,t is a continuum of differentiated goods, given by
CiN,t =
[∫ 1
0
CiN,t( j)
ε−1
ε d j
] ε
ε−1
(3.5)
The parameter ε > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between any two
differentiated nontradable goods.
3.3.2 Budget constraints and financial markets
This section characterizes financial frictions that households face, distinguishing
this chapter from previous research. With complete financial markets, heteroge-
neous households can share risk arising from sector-specific shocks (or shocks
that have asymmetric effects across sectors), implying that monetary policy has
no distributional consequences. This assumption is unrealistic in the context of
emerging market economies, where financial frictions are pervasive and a large
share of households do not have access to formal financial markets.5
Since most of these households work in the informal sector that produces
5Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Klapper (2012) find that a majority of households in most emerging mar-
ket economies lacks access to the formal financial system. By contrast, in advanced economies
nearly all households have such access.
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mainly nontradable goods, I assume that households working in this sector lack
access to financial markets and simply consume their wage income in each pe-
riod. So these households are akin to “rule of thumb” consumers.6 A represen-
tative household in the nontradable sector maximizes its lifetime utility, given by
equation (3.1), subject to the budget constraint:
PtCNt = WN,tL
N
t + ΠN,t (3.6)
where the right hand side is the total value of output in the nontradable goods
sector. WN,t is the nominal wage in the nontradable goods sector and ΠN,t repre-
sents profits earned by firms in this sector. The total expenditure needed to attain
a consumption index CNt is given by PtCNt where Pt is defined as
Pt =
[
bP1−ξT,t + (1 − b)P1−ξN,t
] 1
1−ξ (3.7)
PT,t denotes the price of tradable goods and is given by
PT,t =
[
aP1−ηH,t + (1 − a)P1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η (3.8)
PN,t, the price index of nontradable goods, is defined as
6As discussed below, there is no physical capital in the model and also no alternative storage
technology that would allow for intertemporal consumption smoothing by households that have
no access to financial markets.
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PN,t =
[∫ 1
0
PN,t( j)1−εd j
] 1
1−ε
(3.9)
Households in the tradable goods sector receive labor income and can buy
one-period nominal bonds and foreign bonds to smooth their consumption. A
representative household in this sector maximizes lifetime utility, given by equa-
tion (3.1), subject to the following budget constraint
PtCTt + Bt + etB
∗
t +
ψB
2
B∗t
2 ≤ WT,tLTt + Rt−1Bt−1 + etR∗t−1B∗t−1 (3.10)
where Bt and B∗t represents the quantity of one-period nominal risk-free discount
bonds denominated in domestic and foreign currencies, respectively. The nominal
exchange rate is denoted by et and the gross nominal interest rates for the two
types of bonds are denoted by Rt and R∗t , respectively.7 WT,t is the nominal wage
in the tradable goods sector and LTt is the labor supply in this sector.
3.3.3 Production
Firms in the tradable goods sector use a linear technology in labor YH,t = AH,tLTt ,
subject to a common productivity shock AH,t. Firms in this sector are price takers.
Import prices are exogenous and follow the law of one price. The terms of trade,
which links import and export prices, determines the export price. Thus, PH,t =
7I also include a small quadratic portfolio holding cost for foreign bond holdings, as suggested
by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), only to induce stationarity.
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S tPF,t, where S t is the terms of trade. The zero profit condition then determines
labor demand and wages.
Similarly, firms in the nontradable goods sector use a linear technology in labor
YN,t( j) = AN,tLNt ( j) and are subject to a common productivity shock AN,t. Following
Calvo (1983), I assume that a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of firms cannot change their price
in each period. The remaining firms choose the optimal reset price to maximize
their discounted future profits:
max
PN,t( j)
Et
∞∑
s=0
{
(βθ)s
(
CNt+s
−σ
Pt+s
) [
PN,t( j) − MCN,t+s]YN,t+s( j)} (3.11)
where MC denotes the marginal cost of production in nominal terms.
3.3.4 Monetary policy
I define aggregate inflation as pit= Pt/Pt−1 , inflation in the nontradable goods sec-
tor as piN,t = PN,t/PN,t−1, and tradable goods sector inflation as piT,t = PT,t/PT,t−1.
The steady state is characterized by constant prices (zero inflation) and no price
stickiness in the economy.
The central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate Rt according to a
simple inflation-targeting rule, with a possible additional response to exchange
rate fluctuations (see, e.g., Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007):
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log
(
Rt
R
)
= ρ log
(
Rt−1
R
)
+ (1 − ρ)
[
φpilog
(
pit
pi
)
+ φelog
(
et
et−1
)]
(3.12)
where p¯i and R¯ are the steady state values of inflation and the nominal interest
rate, respectively. The term ρ represents the central banker’s preference for inter-
est rate smoothing.8 φpi and φe are the weights assigned by the central banker to
the deviations of inflation from its steady state level and to the fluctuations of the
nominal exchange rate.9 Setting the parameter φe to zero implies a pure inflation
targeting regime, wherein the central banker is not concerned about the level of
the exchange rate except insofar as it affects inflation. I set inflation targeting as
the benchmark rule and then conduct policy experiments to study the distribu-
tional effects of alternative monetary policy rules that place varying weights on
the exchange rate.
8Interest rate smoothing behavior by central banks and its benefits are well documented (Clar-
ida, Galı´, and Gertler, 1998). Mohanty and Klau (2005) find that emerging market central banks
also place substantial weight on interest rate smoothing. The formulation of the monetary policy
rule with interest rate smoothing is similar to that used by Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler (1999).
9Technically, one could also formulate a policy rule that includes the deviation of the exchange
rate from its steady-state level rather than changes in the level of the exchange rate. However,
this would be harder to interpret and operationalize in an environment where nominal and real
shocks can continuously affect the steady-state level of the nominal exchange rate. The formula-
tion in equation (3.12) is in line with the stated objective of many emerging market central banks
that describe such policies as “leaning against the wind” to limit sharp short-run exchange rate
volatility. In any event, the results were qualitatively similar when I used deviations of the nomi-
nal exchange rate from its steady-state level in the policy rule.
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3.3.5 Exogenous shock process
I assume that productivity shocks in the tradable and nontradable goods sectors
follow AR(1) processes. Firms in the export sector are subject to terms of trade
shocks as they are price takers and face international market prices that are deter-
mined exogenously. The small open economy may also face foreign interest rate
shocks. To sum up, there are four shocks in the model, with innovations to each
of them drawn from i.i.d. normal distributions:
Productivity shock, tradable goods: log
(
AH,t
AH
)
= ρHa log
(
AH,t−1
AH
)
+ εHt , ε
H
t ∼ N(0, σHa )
Productivity shock, nontradable goods: log
(
AN,t
AN
)
= ρNa log
(
AN,t−1
AN
)
+ εNt , ε
N
t ∼ N(0, σNa )
Terms of trade shock, exports: log
(
S t
S
)
= ρslog
(
S t−1
S
)
+ εt
σ, εσt ∼ N(0, σs)
Foreign interest rate shock: log
(
R∗t
R
∗
)
= ρrlog
(R∗t−1
R
∗
)
+ εt
r, εrt ∼ N(0, σr)
In the baseline model, I focus on productivity shocks in the tradable sector as
that is central to the questions posed in this chapter and the exact reason why
emerging market central banks want to manage the nominal exchange rate.
3.3.6 Policy evaluation
Given my objective of determining the distributional effects of various monetary
policy rules, I need suitable metrics to evaluate both the temporary consump-
tion effects and welfare effects of specific policy choices in response to particular
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sources of shocks.10
By temporary consumption effects, I mean the temporary effect of nominal ex-
change rate management on consumption when positive productivity shocks hit
the tradable sector. Nominal exchange rate management is desirable if it can tem-
porarily boost consumption in periods of high tradable-sector growth. To quan-
tify temporary consumption effects, I rely on impulse response functions. For
instance, given a one-standard-deviation positive productivity shock in the trad-
able sector, I calculate the accumulated consumption gains or losses under nomi-
nal exchange rate management against the benchmark policy, for a specific type of
household for a sufficiently long period of time T. In other words, the cumulative
difference between the two impulse responses represents the temporary effects of
various monetary policy rules on household consumption.
To measure welfare effects of nominal exchange rate management, I compare
welfare levels of a representative household in a given sector under alternative
policy rules relative to the baseline rule. The welfare effects of alternative mone-
tary policy rules can be quite different from their temporary consumption effects
because the former involve an evaluation of unconditional welfare in an economy
facing continuous symmetric productivity shocks. In other words, a central bank
committed to nominal exchange rate stability will prevent exchange rates from
fluctuating, which may increase consumption in good times but reduce consump-
10I use temporary consumption gains as a measure of distributional effects and the desirability
of a certain policy in the short run because many governments in emerging market economies
consider raising the living standard of their citizens as their primary goal, which is best captured
by consumption.
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tion in bad times.
I compute the second-order accurate consumer welfare measure under various
monetary policy regimes as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004, 2007). Household
welfare in the tradable goods sector is denoted by VTt and that of households in the
nontradable goods sector is denoted by VNt . Aggregate welfare in the economy is
defined as the population-weighted sum of the welfare of the two types of house-
holds: Vtotal = λVTt + (1 − λ)VNt . I define ω, the welfare gain from adopting an al-
ternative policy rule, as the fraction that has to be added to the inflation-targeting
regime’s (where the regime is denoted by r) consumption process to yield a level
of aggregate welfare equivalent to that under regime a. That is,
Va0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU((1 + ω)Crt ,N
r
t ) (3.13)
A positive value of ω means that welfare is higher under the alternative policy
rule. The welfare gain ω is given by
ω =
[
Va0 + D
r
0
Vr0 + D
r
0
] 1
1−σ
− 1 (3.14)
where Dr0 = E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t[φn
(Nrt )
1+ψ
1+ψ ]. A value of ω∗100 = 1, represents a gain of one per-
centage point in permanent consumption under the alternative policy rule relative
to the baseline.
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3.3.7 Parameter selection
Given limited research on macroeconomic models for emerging market
economies, there is no consensus on the values of some parameters and many pa-
rameter values are borrowed from micro data from advanced countries. Nonethe-
less, I try to find the most reasonable parameter values and implement sensitivity
analysis with respect to the choice of key parameters to check the robustness of
my results. The values of the key model parameters are summarized in Table 3.1.
The time period in my model is equivalent to a quarter and I pick parameters
corresponding to this frequency.
I choose β = 0.99, which is equivalent to an annual real interest rate of 4 per-
cent. I use σ = 2 as the baseline value of the risk-aversion parameter, a value
commonly used in the literature on emerging market economies (Aguiar and
Gopinath, 2007; Devereux, Lane, and Xu, 2006; Garcı´a-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe,
2010). The share of domestically produced tradable goods, denoted by a, is set
at 0.7. This implies that, in the steady state, 70 percent of all tradable goods con-
sumed in the home country are produced domestically. The consumption weight
of tradable goods b is set at 0.6. The value chosen for a is common in the open
economy literature (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001) and I use the combined shares of
the agricultural and manufacturing sectors in emerging market economies to ap-
proximate b. I set the probability that a price in the nontradable sector remains
fixed in a given period (θ) at 0.66 (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). This implies
that prices in that sector do not adjust for a mean duration of 3 quarters.
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values Used in Chapter 3
Parameter Definition Value
β Discount factor 0.99
σ Risk-aversion coefficient 2
λ Share of households working in the tradable goods sector 0.6
a Share of domestically produced tradable goods in total tradable goods 0.7
b Share of tradable goods in total output 0.6
ε Elasticity of substitution between different varieties 11
η Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign tradable goods 2
ξ Elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods 0.6
ψ Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1.5
ψb Interest rate elasticity of debt (for technical reasons only) 0.0007
θ Probability of not being able to reset price in a given quarter 0.66
Policy Parameters
(baseline)
ρ Degree of interest rate smoothing 0.75
φpi Degree of response to inflation 1.5
φy Degree of response to nominal exchange rate 0.5
Shock Parameters
ρHa , σHa Productivity shocks in the tradable goods sector: persistence, std. dev. 0.90, 0.020
ρNa , σNa Productivity shocks in the nontradable goods sector: persistence, std.
dev.
0.90, 0.015
ρs, σs Terms of trade shocks in the tradable goods sector: persistence, std. dev. 0.47, 0.047
ρr, σr Foreign interest rate shocks: persistence, std. dev. 0.46, 0.012
Notes: A period in the model corresponds to one quarter.
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An important set of parameters in my model concerns the elasticities of sub-
stitution across varieties of nontradable goods, between tradable and nontradable
goods, and across countries.11 The elasticities of substitution between home- and
foreign-produced tradable goods and across foreign countries are assumed to be
2 (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2005, 2007). The elasticity of substitution between trad-
able and nontradable goods is set at 0.6 based on the existing literature (Mendoza,
1995; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004). The elasticity of substitution across vari-
eties of nontradable goods, ε, is set to 11, implying a steady state mark-up of 1.1
(Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler, 1999, 2002).
For my benchmark case, the Frisch elasticity (1/ψ) is assumed to be 2/3 (in
other words, ψ = 1.5).12 For the monetary policy parameters, I follow Clarida,
Galı´, and Gertler (1998) and choose ρ = 0.75 and φpi = 1.5. I set the values of the AR
(1) coefficients at 0.9 for productivity shocks to both the tradable and nontradable
goods sectors, consistent with the literature (e.g., Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). It
is reasonable to assume that the volatility of productivity shocks in emerging mar-
ket economies is higher than in advanced countries (Garcı´a-Cicco, Pancrazi, and
Uribe, 2010), so I set the standard deviation of the tradable sector productivity
shock at σHa = 0.02 and the standard deviation of the nontradable productivity
shock at σNa = 0.015. I borrow the parameter values of the persistence and stan-
11Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) include a detailed discussion regarding parameter selection in such
models and review relevant empirical studies.
12Estimates of this parameter range from 0.25 to 1. Given the gap between macro- and micro-
level estimates of labor supply elasticity and the informal nature of labor markets in developing
countries, I set the baseline labor supply elasticity to be slightly higher than the common value
used for developed countries.
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dard deviation of the foreign interest rate shock from Devereux, Lane, and Xu
(2006), and choose ρr = 0.46 and the standard deviation parameter σr = 0.012.
For terms-of-trade shocks, I follow Mendoza (1995) and choose ρs = 0.47 and
σs = 0.047.
3.4 Baseline Results
I now present the main results of the model and evaluate the temporary consump-
tion effects and welfare effects, both at the aggregate level and across types of
households, of adopting various monetary policy rules. The baseline policy rule
for the central bank is inflation targeting.13 Two alternative policy rules are also
considered: a fixed nominal exchange rate and nominal exchange rate smoothing,
the latter of which is akin to the ”leaning against the wind” approach ostensibly
adopted by many emerging market central banks.
3.4.1 Temporary consumption effects
To understand the dynamics of key variables in the model, I begin by analyzing
their responses to a positive productivity shock in the home economy’s tradable
sector, which characterizes a period of high tradable-sector growth. This shock
13The version of inflation targeting that I consider is in effect “strict” headline inflation targeting
as it does not include other variables such as the output gap or wage inflation in the central bank’s
policy rule. I consider flexible inflation targeting later in this chapter.
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is to be interpreted as a country-specific productivity shock that is transitory but
persistent and, in most models (including this one) induces a real exchange rate
appreciation. Given the lack of a well-defined welfare criterion when I focus on
just the temporary effect, my approach is to evaluate the effects of various policy
rules on the consumption patterns of the two types of households in response to
the productivity shock.
Figure 3.2 shows the impulse responses for key variables under various mon-
etary policy rules. A positive productivity shock of course improves aggregate
consumption, so the distributional consequences are of greater interest. House-
hold consumption in the traded goods sector is higher when the central bank
temporarily reduces exchange rate appreciation relative to the case in which the
central bank adopts inflation targeting. By contrast, household consumption in
the nontradable sector is better under inflation targeting compared with any de-
gree of exchange rate management. These distributional effects are monotonic in
the weight ascribed to the nominal exchange rate in the central bank’s policy rule,
with the effects being largest in the case of a fixed exchange rate. As expected,
the real exchange rate eventually adjusts through higher inflation and there is no
difference in the long-run path of the real exchange rate independent of the policy
rule.
Why do households in the tradable sector do better under a policy rule that
involves nominal exchange management rather than inflation targeting? These
households do not enjoy the benefits of higher productivity in the tradable sector
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Responses to a Positive Productivity Shock in the Tradable
Goods Sector
Notes: This figure shows the responses of several variables to a one stan-
dard deviation productivity shock to the home economy’s tradable goods sector.
Three monetary policy rules are considered. The black solid lines are impulse
responses under an inflation-targeting rule, the dashed red lines represent
impulse responses under an exchange rate smoothing rule, and the dotted blue
lines show impulse responses under a fixed exchange rate regime. The responses
are all expressed as percentage deviations from the steady-state values of the
corresponding variables. A decline in the exchange rate (both nominal and real)
indicates appreciation.
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as much as households in the nontradable sector because the shock leads to a
sharp increase in the relative price of nontradable goods. A temporary increase
in the productivity of tradable goods production drives up the relative price of
nontradable goods through two channels: an increase in the price of nontradable
goods and a decrease in the price of tradable goods. Since the price of tradable
goods is determined in international markets and priced in the foreign currency,
the nominal exchange rate directly pins down its price in domestic currency.
When the monetary policy rule involves inflation targeting, the home currency
appreciates following the positive productivity shock, leading to a drop in the
price of tradable goods. As a result, the relative price of nontradable goods tends
to rise even more. By contrast, if the central bank offsets or dampens nominal
exchange rate appreciation, tradable goods prices do not adjust as much and the
burden of the relative price adjustment falls to the nontradable sector. Price stick-
iness in that sector implies that the increase in nontradable goods prices is more
gradual, so the relative price of nontradable goods adjusts more slowly. Thus,
households in the tradable sector enjoy a relatively more favorable relative price
and achieve higher consumption levels temporarily, compared with the scenario
of an inflation-targeting central bank. In fact, the more the central bank man-
ages the nominal exchange rate, the smoother the relative price and the higher the
consumption gain of households in the tradable sector relative to the inflation-
targeting case.14
14Since the tradable sector has flexible prices, employment and wage responses in that sector
are similar across policy rules when the sector experiences a productivity shock.
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This process, despite its similarity to the traditional Balassa-Samuelson ef-
fect, differs in the underlying mechanism. In the Balassa-Samuelson framework,
higher productivity growth in the tradable sector pushes up wages in that sec-
tor and, to equalize wages across sectors, the relative price of nontradable goods
must rise. In my model, a temporary increase in productivity in the tradable sector
drives up the relative price of nontradable goods not through wage equalization,
since labor is assumed to be immobile, but through household demand for trad-
able and nontradable goods.
3.4.2 Welfare effects
Next, I turn to an evaluation of the welfare effects of various policy rules using the
welfare criterion defined in Section 3.3.6. Table 3.2 shows the implications under
various policy rules for both temporary consumption effects and welfare effects.
While targeting the nominal exchange rate provides temporary benefits to house-
holds working in the tradable sector relative to those working in the nontradable
sector, the welfare effects are, surprisingly, reversed. Under the welfare criterion,
households working in the tradable sector do worse under either of the policies
that involve exchange rate management. By contrast, households working in the
nontradable sector do marginally better under the welfare criterion when the cen-
tral bank does not follow inflation targeting. More interestingly, aggregate house-
hold welfare in the economy is also slightly lower when the central bank manages
the nominal exchange rate. These results all run in the same direction and are
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Table 3.2: Temporary Consumption Effects and Welfare Effects under Nominal
Exchange Rate Management
Scenario
T Households NT Households Aggregate
Temp. Welfare Temp. Welfare Temp. Welfare
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.11% -0.03% -0.07% 0.01% 0.04% -0.01%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.39% -0.12% -0.24% 0.05% 0.14% -0.06%
Notes: This table shows the temporary consumption gains (or losses) and welfare gains from
two policy rules–exchange rate smoothing and a fixed exchange rate–relative to an inflation
targeting rule. The numbers are expressed in percentage points of cumulative consumption
gains/losses over the short run (16 quarters) or percentage points of permanent consumption
gains/losses relative to the baseline policy rule under the welfare criterion. “T households”
refers to households working in the tradable goods sector; “NT households” refers to house-
holds working in the nontradable goods sector.
stronger when the central bank’s policy rule involves a fixed exchange rate rather
than exchange rate smoothing.
A key point to keep in mind is that the temporary effects on consumption are
based on a scenario in which there is a transitory positive shock to productivity
in the traded goods sector, namely during periods of booming exports. So my
statements about temporary consumption effects are conditional on that specific
shock. When conducting welfare evaluations, I of course need to consider random
productivity shocks, both positive and negative. In this case, a monetary policy
rule that attempts to stabilize the nominal exchange rate magnifies the volatility of
household consumption in the tradable sector but reduces consumption volatility
for households in the nontradable sector. Since welfare levels in my model depend
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crucially on the volatility of consumption, households working in the tradable
sector paradoxically attain a lower level of welfare if monetary policy deviates
from inflation targeting.
In short, a policy of stabilizing the exchange rate to temporarily benefit house-
holds in the traded goods sector can generate unfavorable welfare consequences
for those very households and for the economy as a whole.
3.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
As noted earlier, it is difficult to pin down the values of certain parameters in
my model due to the dearth of relevant empirical evidence for emerging market
economies. I now report sensitivity tests to evaluate the impact of a few key pa-
rameters on both temporary consumption effects and welfare effects. This exercise
also provides further insights into the mechanisms underlying my key results.
The distributional effects are most significant when the elasticity of substitu-
tion between tradable and nontradable goods is smaller, the share of tradable sec-
tor output is not large, and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is high. My key
conclusions concerning the distributional consequences of alternative monetary
policy rules are preserved across a broad range of values for these key parame-
ters.
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Table 3.3: Sensitivity of Results to Key Parameters
Value Scenario
T Households NT Households Aggregate
Temp. Welfare Temp. Welfare Temp. Welfare
A. Elasticity of Substitution between Tradable and Nontradable Goods (baseline: ξ = 0.6)
0.5
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.20% -0.06% -0.21% 0.05% 0.03% -0.02%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.73% -0.32% -0.77% 0.24% 0.13% -0.09%
0.6
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.11% -0.03% -0.07% 0.01% 0.04% -0.01%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.39% -0.12% -0.24% 0.05% 0.14% -0.06%
0.7
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.08% -0.01% -0.02% 0.00% 0.04% -0.01%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.26% -0.06% -0.05% 0.00% 0.13% -0.04%
B. Relative Size of Tradable Goods Sector (baseline: b = 0.6)
0.5
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.16% -0.03% -0.05% 0.00% 0.06% -0.02%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.60% -0.18% -0.18% 0.02% 0.21% - 0.10%
0.6
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.11% -0.03% -0.07% 0.01% 0.04% -0.01%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.39% -0.12% -0.24% 0.05% 0.14% -0.06%
0.7
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.07% -0.02% -0.08% 0.02% 0.03% 0.00%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.23% -0.08% -0.26% 0.07% 0.08% -0.02%
C. Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply (baseline: ψ = 1.5)
1.0
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.15% -0.03% -0.10% 0.02% 0.05% -0.01%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.54% -0.16% -0.36% 0.08% 0.18% -0.06%
1.5
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.11% -0.03% -0.07% 0.01% 0.04% -0.01%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.39% -0.12% -0.24% 0.05% 0.14% -0.06%
2.0
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.09% -0.02% -0.05% 0.01% 0.03% -0.01%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.31% -0.11% -0.18% 0.04% 0.11% -0.05%
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Elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods
The elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods (ξ) deter-
mines how responsive the relative price of nontradable goods is to productivity
shocks in the tradable sector. When the elasticity of substitution is low, a tempo-
rary increase (decrease) in the supply of tradable goods when that sector experi-
ences a positive productivity shock is likely to drive up (down) the relative price
of nontradable goods to a greater extent. As a result, the distributional effects of
monetary policy are also likely to be larger.
As shown in Table 3.3 (Panel A), the sizes of both temporary consumption
effects and welfare effects of nominal exchange rate management depend on this
elasticity of substitution. When the elasticity is lower, the temporary consumption
gains of households working in the tradable sector and temporary consumption
losses of households working in the nontradable sectors both increase. Similarly,
the absolute values of welfare effects are also larger when the elasticity is lower.
The temporary aggregate consumption effects do not change much with varia-
tions in this parameter, but the negative welfare effects of exchange rate manage-
ment tend to increase as this elasticity decreases.
Share of tradable goods sector output
The share of tradable goods sector output (b) affects the relative share of trad-
able goods in the final consumption bundle and, consequently, influences relative
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price fluctuations. As shown in Table 3.3 (Panel B), both the temporary consump-
tion gains and the welfare losses from the central bank’s exchange rate manage-
ment are smaller (in absolute terms) for households working in the tradable sector
when the share of tradable sector output is higher. This is because, as the tradable
sector accounts for a larger share, the home economy converges to a flexible price
economy in which monetary policy does not have real effects. By contrast, as the
relative size of the tradable sector decreases, the temporary consumption gains
and welfare losses for households working in this sector both increase. Aggregate
temporary consumption gains and welfare losses behave similarly.
When the relative size of the tradable sector increases, aggregate inflation is
more sensitive to exchange rate policy because tradable goods prices are deter-
mined by the nominal exchange rate. This increases the impact of nominal ex-
change rate management on households working in the nontradable sector. The
model confirms this intuition as the temporary consumption losses and welfare
gains of households working in the nontradable sector increase when b is larger.
Frisch elasticity of labor supply
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is the elasticity of labor supply conditional
on a fixed level of consumption. In the model, it is given by the inverse of the
parameter ψ. In Table 3.3 (Panel C), I compare the temporary consumption effects
and welfare levels under various values of ψ. The results are intuitive. The sizes of
the temporary consumption effects and welfare effects are larger when the Frisch
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elasticity of labor supply is higher (corresponding to a smaller ψ). The underlying
reason for this result is that, when the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is higher,
the household labor supply is more responsive to changes in real wages. When
the central bank manages the nominal exchange rate, the real wage for households
working in the tradable sector is higher for a given positive productivity shock,
so the gain in consumption increases as the labor supply response increases. For
the same reason, the temporary consumption loss for households working in the
nontradable sector is higher.
3.5 Extensions
In this section, I discuss extensions of the model that enable me to study a broader
range of policy questions. First, targeting the real exchange rate leads to tempo-
rary consumption effects and welfare effects that are almost identical to the effects
of targeting the nominal exchange rate. Second, I find that the distributional ef-
fects of nominal exchange rate management are larger when the economy is sub-
ject to controls on cross-border capital flows. I also find that a fixed exchange rate
delivers worse outcomes relative to inflation targeting even in terms of temporary
consumption effects–for households in both the traded goods sector and the ag-
gregate economy–when the economy faces positive shocks to productivity in the
nontradable sector or to foreign interest rates. It is important to emphasize here
that I cannot compare consumption and welfare gains or losses across distinct ver-
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sions of the basic model since they have different steady states. My comparisons
are about the effects of monetary policy rules conditional on a particular model
setting.
3.5.1 Real exchange rate management
Calvo, Reinhart, and Vegh (1995) document that emerging market central banks
often try to target the real exchange rate, even though such targeting is effec-
tive only temporarily and could even generate aggregate instability (Uribe, 2003).
Nevertheless, in the short run, real exchange rate changes do tend to be closely
correlated with nominal exchange rate changes (see, e.g., Burstein and Gopinath,
2014). To evaluate the implications of real exchange rate targeting, I modify the
baseline interest rate rule in equation (3.12) to include the change in the real ex-
change rate rather than in the nominal exchange rate:
log
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= ρ log
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)]
(3.15)
where qet is the real exchange rate.
In Table 3.4 (Panel A), I compare the temporary consumption effects and wel-
fare effects of targeting the nominal and real exchange rates, with inflation tar-
geting serving as the benchmark rule. There is little difference between the two
exchange rate targets. In the short run, prices are sticky, so the two exchange
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rates are correlated and the corresponding interest rate rules suggest similar pol-
icy rates. In technical terms, because log(qet /qet−1) = log(et/et−1) − pit, the only differ-
ence between targeting real and targeting nominal exchange rates is the implied
response to inflation. In the long run, prices become flexible, so there is no differ-
ence in welfare outcomes between the two targeting rules.
3.5.2 Capital controls
Emerging market economies often supplement monetary policy with capital con-
trols to reduce capital flow and currency volatility, and also to make it easier to
manage the exchange rate. These controls can take the form of bureaucratic re-
strictions on international capital flows (Chang, Liu, and Spiegel, 2015), a tax on
international financial transactions (Jeanne and Korinek, 2010; Gabaix and Mag-
giori, 2015), or simply a wedge in the uncovered interest parity equation (Farhi
and Werning, 2014).
I introduce capital controls in a manner similar to Chang, Liu, and Spiegel
(2015) by setting the parameter ψB, which represents the one-period portfolio
holdings cost for foreign bond holdings, at 1 for the case with capital controls.
This is a plausible value for this parameter based on the estimates of Garcı´a-Cicco,
Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010). Under the capital controls scenario, households work-
ing in the tradable goods sector face higher costs when smoothing consumption
intertemporally using foreign bonds. This renders the relative price between trad-
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Table 3.4: Temporary Consumption Effects and Welfare Effects under Alternative
Policy Experiments
Scenario
T Households NT Households Aggregate
Temp. Welfare Temp. Welfare Temp. Welfare
A. Real Exchange Rate Management
Nominal Exchange Rate 0.11% -0.03% -0.07% 0.01% 0.04% -0.01%
Real Exchange Rate 0.10% -0.03% -0.07% 0.01% 0.04% -0.01%
B. Capital Controls
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.19% -0.09% -0.08% 0.04% 0.09% -0.04%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.97% -0.55% -0.38% 0.22% 0.43% -0.24%
C. Fiscal Policy
Tax on Nontradable Goods 0.36% 0.00% -0.59% 0.00% -0.03% 0.00%
Subsidy on Nontradable Goods -0.37% 0.00% 0.60% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00%
D. Flexible Inflation Targeting
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.25% -0.01% -0.16% 0.01% 0.09% 0.00%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.78% -0.16% -0.48% 0.06% 0.28% -0.07%
Notes: This table shows the temporary consumption gains (or losses) and welfare gains from alternative
policy rules relative to an inflation targeting rule under alternative policy experiments. Panel A compares
the effects of nominal and real exchange rate targeting relative to pure inflation targeting. For the results
shown in Panel B, capital controls are imposed regardless of the policy regime. As shown in Panel C,
the monetary policy rule is inflation targeting in the baseline and alternative scenarios. The latter two
scenarios involve a 3 percent tax or subsidy, respectively, on nontradable goods. As shown in Panel D,
the baseline (inflation targeting) and exchange rate smoothing rules include an output gap term. The
numbers are expressed in percent of cumulative consumption gains/losses over the short run (16 quarters)
or percentage points of permanent consumption gains/losses relative to the baseline policy rule under the
welfare criterion.
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able and nontradable goods more responsive to productivity shocks as well as
alternative monetary policy rules.15
Figure 3.3 shows that household consumption levels are more responsive to
productivity shocks than in the baseline model. Moreover, monetary policy has
larger distributional effects compared with the baseline model. When faced with
capital controls, households working in the tradable goods sector spend more of
their income when a positive productivity shock hits their sector, resulting in an
even larger increase in the relative prices of nontradable goods. Managing the
nominal exchange rate has larger distributional effects in the short run, following
the same mechanism discussed in the baseline model but with larger magnitudes.
Thus, in an environment with capital controls, emerging market central banks are
more likely to use exchange rate management if they are subject to political pres-
sures from households in the tradable goods sector, as the effects of such policies
are greater relative to inflation targeting.
Table 3.4 (Panel B) shows the temporary consumption effects and welfare ef-
fects of alternative monetary policy rules in an economy with capital controls.
Relative to the baseline model with unrestricted capital flows (Table 3.2), the dis-
tributional effects are stronger under capital controls. Notably, not only are these
effects stronger for both types of households, the aggregate effects are also larger.
In other words, while policymakers have a stronger incentive to use monetary
15Jeanne and Korinek (2010) and Jeanne (2012) show that capital controls can be used to affect
the real exchange rate in a model that has tradable and nontradable goods, although their models
are entirely real–there is no money or monetary policy.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses to a Positive Productivity Shock in the Tradable
Goods Sector (with Capital Controls)
Notes: This figure shows the responses of several variables to a one-standard-
deviation productivity shock to the home economy’s tradable goods sector.
Capital controls are imposed regardless of the policy regime. Three monetary
policy rules are considered. The solid black lines are impulse responses under
an inflation targeting rule, the dashed red lines represent impulse responses
under an exchange rate smoothing rule, and the dotted blue lines show impulse
responses under a fixed exchange rate regime. The responses are all expressed
as percentage deviations from the steady-state values of the corresponding
variables. A decline in the exchange rate (both nominal and real) indicates
appreciation.
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policy to achieve temporary distributional objectives, this comes at a higher cost
in terms of aggregate welfare.
3.5.3 Fiscal policy
As discussed in the baseline model, developing countries’ central banks can use
monetary policy to achieve certain distributional consequences. By targeting the
nominal exchange rate, the central bank can smooth the adjustment of the relative
price of nontradable goods and temporarily increase the consumption of house-
holds working in the tradable goods sector. However, monetary or exchange rate
policies are not necessarily the right tools with which to address domestic or ex-
ternal shocks in an open economy setting.
Instead, fiscal policy is often the more efficient and direct policy instrument for
redistribution across households.16 The tax and transfer system in emerging mar-
ket countries is typically not sophisticated enough to allow for state-contingent
direct transfers that can help complete financial markets and achieve perfect risk-
sharing. Nevertheless, there are simple fiscal tools that are feasible to implement
and could attain some of these benefits. In particular, I study the impact of a
16Farhi, Gopinath, and Itskhoki (2014) show that a small set of conventional fiscal instruments
can robustly replicate the real allocations attained under a nominal exchange rate devaluation in
a dynamic New Keynesian open economy environment. However, theirs is a one-sector model
without financial frictions or heterogeneous households. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2011) show
that, in a model with downward wage rigidity and an inelastic labor supply, a payroll tax subsidy
can replicate the effects of a nominal devaluation. Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2008) and Correia
et al. (2013) show that fiscal instruments can replicate the effects of optimal monetary policy. This
section of my chapter is related to these papers, but none of them addresses distributional issues.
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proportional tax and subsidy on nontradable goods and compare their temporary
consumption effects and welfare effects with the effects of nominal exchange rate
targeting. My interest here is in analyzing how fiscal and monetary policies inter-
act in a small open economy setting with financial frictions in determining distri-
butional effects of various shocks. This allows me to make a normative statement
about whether fiscal policy would be a more effective tool than monetary policy
even if the government’s focus is on achieving specific distributional objectives.
To be more specific, I consider alternative fiscal policy regimes with varying
tax rates on nontradable goods: the baseline case with no taxes; a case with a
3 percent tax on nontradable goods, with the proceeds of the tax distributed in
a lump sum fashion across all households in the economy; and a case with a 3
percent subsidy on nontradable goods, with the subsidy financed through a lump
sum tax on all households. The tax/subsidy is set as a wedge between labor wages
and goods prices. Furthermore, to facilitate comparison between policy regimes,
there is a direct transfer between households to keep their respective steady-state
consumption levels unchanged from the baseline case. Thus, the shift in relative
prices is the main channel through which fiscal policy has temporary consump-
tion effects. Regardless of the fiscal policy setting, the monetary policy rule is pure
inflation targeting.
The results are summarized in Table 3.4 (Panel C). A tax on nontradable goods
has distributional effects that are similar to nominal exchange rate targeting. The
imposition of taxes on nontradable goods implies that households working in the
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tradable goods sector will be better off after a positive productivity shock to that
sector, due to the relative price effect. By contrast, households working in the non-
tradable goods sector exhibit lower temporary consumption under this regime.
The results are reversed but symmetric when there is a subsidy on nontradable
goods. While the temporary consumption effects are similar to a policy of target-
ing the nominal exchange rate, the welfare effects differ. In fact, fiscal policy is
close to welfare neutral, at both the household and aggregate levels, because the
constant sales tax (or subsidy) on nontradable goods does not affect intertemporal
household choices.
The implication is that fiscal policy can in principle be more effective than ex-
change rate policy for attaining distributional objectives. While previous authors
have made the point that fiscal policy can be more effective than exchange rate
policy (or can serve as a substitute when there are constraints on exchange rate
management) in an open economy setting, my contribution here is to show that
this is true even when the objectives are related to distributional rather than ag-
gregate consequences.
3.5.4 Flexible inflation targeting
In practice, emerging market central banks set interest rates to manage not just
inflation and the exchange rate but also the output gap (the deviation of output
from its steady state or trend level). In a specific setting that incorporates local
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currency pricing, Engel (2011) finds that the optimal instrument rule involves re-
sponding only to the deviation of inflation from its target level even if the central
bank cares about inflation, output, and exchange rate misalignment. Neverthe-
less, it is relevant in a more general setting to consider flexible inflation targeting
as the baseline for assessing the distributional effects of nominal exchange rate
management. This is consistent with the basic formulation of the Taylor (1993)
rule for monetary policy.
To this end, I modify the interest rate rule in equation (3.12) to include a pos-
itive weight on the output gap. This yields the following operational rule for
monetary policy:
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where φy is the output gap response coefficient, Yt represents output in period t,
and Y denotes steady-state output. Since a period in my model is equal to one
quarter, I set φy to 0.125 as the baseline value. As discussed in Galı´ (2015) and
Smets and Wouters (2007), this matches the annualized coefficient value proposed
in Taylor (1993).
I summarize the results obtained using this more general formulation of mon-
etary policy rules in Table 3.4 (Panel D). The baseline is flexible inflation targeting
and the output gap term also enters the exchange rate smoothing rule but does
not appear in the fixed exchange rate rule. The temporary distributional effects of
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exchange rate targeting rules relative to the baseline are larger when the central
bank responds to the output gap. This is because a positive productivity shock
now leads to a positive output gap, which drives up the interest rate and, conse-
quently, the nominal exchange rate as well. Hence, exchange rate management
now involves large temporary consumption gains for households in the tradable
goods sector relative to the baseline rule. Households in the nontradable goods
sector, by contrast, do significantly worse in terms of temporary consumption rel-
ative to the baseline rule because the adjustment of relative prices between trad-
able and nontradable goods is less favorable to them.
As expected, the welfare effects are similar to the baseline experiments with
strict inflation targeting, with the welfare of households in the tradable goods
sector and aggregate welfare both lower when the central bank incorporates the
exchange rate in its operational rule. The welfare effects again mostly reflect the
consumption volatility channel as nominal rigidities play no role in the long run.
3.5.5 Alternative shocks
When the central bank uses monetary policy to achieve certain distributional ob-
jectives, it commits to a particular policy rule. However, this may have unex-
pected consequences when the economy is hit by shocks other than the produc-
tivity shocks to the tradable goods sector that I have emphasized up to this point.
I now examine the temporary consumption effects and welfare effects of nominal
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exchange rate management when the economy faces three other types of shocks.17
The results discussed below are summarized in Table 3.5.
Productivity shocks in the nontradable goods sector
I first consider a scenario in which the economy faces productivity shocks only
in the nontradable goods sector (see the first two rows of Table 3.5). In this case,
relative to inflation targeting, nominal exchange rate management has adverse
consequences for households in the tradable goods sector in terms of both tem-
porary consumption and welfare. A positive productivity shock in the nontrad-
able goods sector drives down the relative price of nontradable goods, leading to
higher household consumption in the tradable goods sector. Following the same
mechanism as in the baseline model, nominal exchange rate management slows
the adjustment in the relative price compared with a policy of inflation target-
ing, thus hurting households working in the tradable goods sector and benefit-
ing those working in the nontradable goods sector. Under a fixed exchange rate,
households in the traded goods sector face a consumption loss of 0.34 percent
(over 16 quarters) relative to pure inflation targeting; under the welfare criterion,
their welfare loss amounts to 0.16 percent of lifetime consumption.
17In this section, I study the temporary consumption effects and welfare effects separately when
the economy faces only one specific type of shocks at a time. This decomposition of the effects of
distinct types of shocks is valid given the theoretical result reported in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004).
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Table 3.5: Temporary Consumption Effects and Welfare Effects under Alternative
Shocks
Scenario
T Households NT Households Aggregate
Temp. Welfare Temp. Welfare Temp. Welfare
A. Productivity Shocks in the Nontradable Goods Sector
Nominal Exchange Rate -0.10% -0.04% 0.07% 0.02% -0.04% -0.02%
Real Exchange Rate -0.34% -0.16% 0.22% 0.06% -0.12% -0.07%
B. Terms of Trade Shocks
Exchange Rate Smoothing 0.01% 0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.11% 0.02% -0.07% -0.01% 0.04% 0.01%
C. Foreign Interest Rate Shocks
Exchange Rate Smoothing -0.01% -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Fixed Exchange Rate -0.46% -0.09% 0.27% 0.04% -0.06% -0.04%
Notes: This table compares the temporary consumption gains (or losses) and welfare gains
from two policy rules—exchange rate smoothing and a fixed exchange rate—relative to an
inflation targeting rule when the home economy faces distinct types of shocks. The numbers
are expressed in percentage points of cumulative consumption gains/losses over the short run
(16 quarters) or percentage points of permanent consumption gains/losses relative to the base-
line policy rule under the welfare criterion. “T households” refers to households working in
the tradable goods sector; “NT households” refers to households working in the nontradable
goods sector.
Terms-of-trade shocks
Terms-of-trade fluctuations are important in driving fluctuations in emerging
market economies (see, e.g., Mendoza, 1995). As seen in the second panel of Table
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3.5 (third and fourth rows), I examine the distributional effects of monetary pol-
icy when the home economy faces terms-of-trade shocks. A higher terms of trade
value implies higher prices for home-produced tradable goods in the foreign cur-
rency. Hence, targeting the nominal exchange rate implies higher relative prices of
tradable goods than is the case with inflation targeting. This temporarily benefits
households working in the tradable goods sector. However, the welfare conse-
quences of the particular choice of policy rule are minimal when the economy is
exposed to these shocks because import and export prices are perfectly flexible.
Foreign interest rate shocks
Emerging market economies are exposed to foreign interest rate shocks that have
significant effects on their business cycles and exchange rate fluctuations.18 When
considering such shocks, I find that a fixed exchange rate benefits households
working in the nontradable goods sector but hurts households working in the
tradable goods sector in terms of both temporary consumption and welfare (see
Table 3.5, last two rows).
A temporary increase in the foreign interest rate tends to cause the domes-
tic currency to depreciate and drive up the demand for home-produced tradable
goods. In this case, stabilizing the nominal exchange rate implies a higher domes-
tic interest rate and encourages households to save more. Households working
18For some early work see, for example, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006).
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in the nontradable goods sector are better off in terms of temporary consump-
tion compared with the outcome under an inflation targeting regime because of a
smaller increase in the relative price of tradable goods. By contrast, households
working in the tradable goods sector are not as well off. The welfare effects for
both types of households have the same signs as temporary consumption effects
(better for households in the nontradable goods sector, worse for those in the trad-
able goods sector) because targeting the nominal exchange rate leads to more
volatile nominal interest rates. Since only households working in the tradable
goods sector have access to financial markets, they are exposed to interest rate
volatility, rendering their consumption more volatile.19
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I developed a two-sector, heterogeneous agent model with incom-
plete financial markets that allowed me to jointly examine the distributional ef-
fects as well as aggregate welfare implications of nominal exchange rate manage-
ment. The features that I incorporated in the model–incomplete financial markets,
sticky prices in the nontradable sector, and limited labor mobility across sectors–
make it especially relevant for the analysis of monetary policy in emerging market
economies.
19Some authors have argued that emerging market economies face highly persistent foreign
interest rate shocks (see, e.g., Garcı´a-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe, 2010; Chang, Liu, and Spiegel,
2015). Allowing for more persistent foreign interest rate shocks magnifies the effects discussed in
this sub-section.
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My main result is that, relative to inflation targeting, exchange rate manage-
ment has a positive but temporary effect on household consumption in the trad-
able sector when that sector faces productivity shocks. Indeed, political pressure
from the tradable sector, in fear of a loss of external competitiveness due to ex-
change rate appreciation, is often a key reason that emerging market central banks
try to manage the nominal exchange rate. However, I find that such a policy can
actually reduce the welfare of households in the traded goods sector as it increases
their consumption volatility. Moreover, such a policy can have negative aggregate
consequences on consumption in periods of high tradable-sector growth.
This result becomes particularly relevant now as central banks in emerging
market economies are busy defending their currencies. For many emerging mar-
ket economies, exchange rate stability is a desirable policy objective because it
helps maintain export competitiveness during booms, but central banks should
also realize that sticking to this rule in downturns will hurt the tradable sector
and reduce aggregate welfare. The distributional effects of nominal exchange rate
management are not as simple as people typically think.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 The Competitive Equilibrium of the MS-DSGE Model
In this section, I present the derivation of the competitive equilibrium of the MS-
DSGE model developed in Chapter 1.
A.1.1 Profit-maximization problem
Here, the profit-maximization problem is similar to that presented in Galı´ and
Monacelli (2005). Firms maximize profits given in equation (1.12) and the opti-
mality condition is given by:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+kYt+k
(
P∗H,t −
ε
ε − 1MCt+k
)}
(A.1)
where MC is the nominal marginal cost. Following the traditional literature, I
introduce an employment subsidy τ such that 1−τ = ε
ε−1 so the flexible price equi-
librium is efficient and the goal of the monetary policy is to eliminate inefficiency
due to nominal rigidities.
Then, I log-linearize the above first-order condition around its steady state:
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p∗H,t = pH,t−1 +
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt{piH,t+k} + (1 − βθ)kEt{m̂ct+k} (A.2)
Combining it with the price distribution, the inflation dynamics of home goods
can be written as below:
p̂iH,t = βEt {̂piH,t−1} + (1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
m̂ct (A.3)
Lastly, the deviation of real marginal cost denoted by home goods can be writ-
ten as below:
m̂ct = σ̂ct + φ̂nt + 1−aa q̂t − ât
= σ̂ct + φ̂yt + 1−aa q̂t − (1 + φ)̂at
(A.4)
where q̂t is the percentage deviation of the real exchange rate from its steady state.
To sump up, the aggregate supply function can be written as:
p̂iH,t = βEt {̂piH,t−1} + (1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(
σ̂ct + φ̂yt +
1 − a
a
q̂t − (1 + φ)̂at
)
(A.5)
A.1.2 Demand for home goods
Demand for home goods is the sum of domestic demand and foreign demand.
By the market clearing condition, total demand is equal to total supply. Domestic
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demand for home goods is a
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct from the household optimization problem.
Aggregate foreign demand C∗t is normalized such that its steady-state value is
equal to the steady-state level of domestic output. Assuming a similar preference
structure, foreign demand for home goods is (1 − a)
(
PH,t
PF,t
)−η
C∗t . Therefore, demand
for home goods can be written as equation (1.14). Furthermore, the log-linearized
relationship can be written as
ŷt = a[−η(−1−aa )̂qt + ĉt] + (1 − a)[−η(−1a )̂qt + ĉ∗t ]
= 1−a
2
a ηq̂t + âct + (1 − a)̂c∗t
(A.6)
A.1.3 The log-linearized system of equations
Competitive equilibrium can be characterized by a system of 11 equations and
11 variables, out of which 8 are endogenous and 3 are exogenous. Here
I write out the complete log-linearized system of equations with variables
{̂ct, p̂iH,t, q̂t, p̂it, ŷt, b̂∗t , ∆̂et, ât ,̂ it ,̂ i∗t , ĉ∗t } as their percentage deviations from their steady
state values.
The resource constraint of the small open economy:
ŷt = ĉt + b̂∗t −
1
β
b̂∗t (A.7)
The log-linearized Euler equation from the domestic bond-holding decision:
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ĉt = Et̂ct+1 − 1
σ
(̂it − Et̂pit+1) (A.8)
The interest rate parity:
ît − Et̂pit+1 = î∗t + Etq̂t+1 − q̂t − ψB̂b∗t (A.9)
The definition of inflation:
p̂it = p̂iH,t +
1 − a
a
(̂qt − q̂t−1) (A.10)
The definition of the real exchange rate:
q̂t − q̂t−1 = ∆̂et − p̂it (A.11)
The interest rate rule:
ît = ρ̂it−1 + (1 − ρ)(φpip̂it + φe∆̂et) (A.12)
The productivity process:
ât = ρâat−1 + εat (A.13)
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The foreign demand process:
ĉ∗t = ρĉc
∗
t−1 + ε
c
t (A.14)
The regime-switching foreign interest rate process:
î∗t = ρr(s)̂i
∗
t−1 + ε
r
t (s) (A.15)
Equations (A.5) - (A.15) constitute the competitive equilibrium of the MS-
DSGE model and its solution can be found using the algorithm illustrated by
Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011).
A.2 Loss Function Derivation
I shall follow the notation in De Paoli (2009) for welfare function derivation. As
mentioned above, the pure quadratic approximation is conducted by approximat-
ing both the welfare function and the relevant first-order conditions up to the sec-
ond order so that I can cancel out all first-order terms.
To begin with, the second-order approximation of the welfare function is given
below:
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Wt0 = UcC¯Et0
∑
βt
[
cˆt − yˆt + 1−σ2 cˆ2t − φ+12 (yˆt − aˆt)2
]
+ t.i.p. + O(||ξ||3)
= UcC¯Et0
∑
βt
[
w′yyt − 12y′tWyyt − y′tWeet − 12wpˆipˆi2t
] (A.16)
where
wpˆi =
ε
κ
, w′y = [−1, 1, 0]
W ′y =

1 + φ 0 0 0
0 −(1 − σ) 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

,W ′e =

−(1 + φ) 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0

Then I need to approximate relevant first-order conditions up to the second or-
der, including the real exchange rate definition, the intertemporal Euler equation,
demand for home goods, and aggregate supply.
First, the vectors and matrices derived from the real exchange rate definition
are:
f ′y = [0, 0,−a,−(1 − a)], f ′e = [0, 0, 0]
F′y =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 −a(1 − η) 0
0 0 0 −(1 − a)(1 − eta)

, F′e = 0
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Second, the vectors and matrices derived from the intertemporal Euler equa-
tion are:
c′y = [0, (1 − β)σ, 0, (β − 1)], c′e = [0,−β, 0]
C′y =

0 0 0 0
0 (β − 1)σ2 0 σ(1 − β)
0 0 0 0
0 σ(1 − β) 0 (β − 1)

,C′e =

0 0 0
0 σβ 0
0 0 0
0 β 0

Third, the vectors and matrices derived from demand for home goods are:
d′y = [−1, a,−η, (1 − a)η], d′e = [0, 0, 1]
D′y =

0 0 0 0
0 a(1 − a) 0 −ηa(1 − a)
0 0 0 0
0 −ηa(1 − a) 0 η2a(1 − a)

,D′e =

0 0 0
0 0 −a(1 − a)
0 0 0
0 0 ηa(1 − a)

Finally, the vectors and matrices derived from aggregate supply are:
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a′y = [φ, σ,−1, 0], a′pi = (φ + 1)
σ
κ
A′y =

φ(2 + φ) σ −1 0
σ −σ2 σ 0
−1 σ −1 0
0 0 0 0

, A′e =

−φ(1 + φ) 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0

After substituting the linear terms in the welfare function, I have:
[ay dy fy cy]Lx = wy (A.17)
The loss function can then be written as:
Lt0 = UcC¯Et0
∑
βt
[
1
2
y′tLyyt + y
′
tLeet +
1
2
lpˆi(pˆiHt )
2
]
+ t.i.p. + O(||ξ||3) (A.18)
where
Ly = Wy + Lx(1)Ay + Lx(2)Dy + Lx(3)Fy + Lx(4)Cy (A.19)
Le = We + Lx(1)Ae + Lx(2)De + Lx(4)Ce (A.20)
lpˆi = wpˆi + Lx(1)apˆi (A.21)
The loss function is then used to compare welfare outcomes under a range of
policy rules.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.1 Comparison of Simulated and Empirical Moments of Infla-
tion
I compare empirical moments of inflation rates with moments from simulations
of my model to assess the relevance of the model to emerging market economies.
While it is not My objective to attain a precise match between model-generated
and empirical moments, the incomplete markets version of the model does better
at matching the empirical moments of data for emerging market economies.
The top panel of Table B.1 reports the standard deviations of overall CPI infla-
tion, food inflation, and nonfood inflation, as well as the standard deviations of
their innovations. Food inflation tends to be more volatile than nonfood inflation
and emerging markets have more volatile inflation rates in all categories relative
to advanced economies. The next two panels report moments from simulations of
the complete and incomplete markets versions of the model in the chapter. The
volatility of CPI inflation and nonfood inflation from the incomplete markets ver-
sion of the model are close to the data; food inflation is more volatile in the model
than in the data. Headline inflation targeting leads to less volatile food inflation
but slightly more volatile nonfood inflation.
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Table B.1: Comparison of Simulated and Empirical Moments of Inflation
CPI Inflation Food Inflation Nonfood Inflation
Standard
Deviations
SD of
Innovation
Standard
Deviations
SD of
Innovation
Standard
Deviations
SD of
Innovation
Empirical Data
Emerging Markets 3.49 3.26 5.00 5.61 2.92 3.72
Advanced Economies 1.48 1.32 2.45 2.75 1.10 1.24
Volatility Ratio 2.36 2.47 2.04 2.04 2.65 3.00
Simulations (Headline)
Incomplete Markets 3.20 5.25 7.99 13.24 2.37 2.77
Complete Markets 1.17 1.87 2.67 4.38 0.93 1.13
Volatility Ratio 2.74 2.81 2.99 3.02 2.55 2.45
Simulations (Core)
Incomplete Markets 4.43 7.26 9.99 16.45 0.96 1.33
Complete Markets 1.51 2.38 3.08 5.01 0.69 0.84
Volatility Ratio 2.93 3.05 3.24 3.28 1.39 1.58
Notes: The data used in constructing this table are from Walsh (2011), and are based on monthly price
indices from 1985 – 2008. The numbers reported are medians for 23 emerging markets and 26 advanced
economies. Standard deviations are based on the month-to-month log changes in the price indices. The
standard deviation of innovations indicates the volatility of changes in food and nonfood inflation. Model
simulations are done for 10,000 periods and based on different assumptions about financial markets.
B.2 Extension: Common Productivity Shocks in Both Sectors
I recomputed the model with a productivity shock common to the food and
the nonfood domestic goods sectors (and, as before, markup and terms of trade
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Table B.2: Welfare Comparisons under Different Inflation Targets
Scenario
Welfare Gain Weights in the Optimal Price Index
Headline Optimal Food Prices Sticky Prices Import Prices
Baseline 0.16% 0.20% 0.35 0.65 0.00
Persistent Shocks 0.03% 0.04% 0.70 0.02 0.28
Transitory Shocks 0.29% 0.50% 1.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The optimal price index comprises food prices, sticky nonfood domestic goods
prices, and import prices. Welfare gains under different parameter values are derived as
permanent consumption gains relative to strict core inflation targeting.
shocks as well). This ought to preserve the welfare gains from targeting inflation
in the headline CPI or the optimal price index as there are no longer any shocks
specific to the rigid price sector. This is indeed what I find, confirming my main
results. The results go through whether the common productivity shock is tran-
sitory (food sector shock) or more persistent (sticky price sector shock). Besides,
food prices consistently have a significant weight in the optimal inflation target.
B.3 Extension: Fiscal Policy Interventions
In principle, fiscal transfers can help improve risk-sharing among households
in the absence of complete markets. While fully state-contingent fiscal transfers
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Table B.3: Welfare Comparisons under Different Levels of Food Tax or Subsidy
Scenario
Welfare Gain Weights in the Optimal Price Index
Headline Optimal Food Prices Sticky Prices Import Prices
Baseline 0.16% 0.20% 0.35 0.65 0.00
5% Food Tax 0.09% 0.14% 0.30 0.70 0.00
10% Food Tax 0.04% 0.10% 0.26 0.74 0.00
5% Food Subsidy 0.25% 0.29% 0.42 0.58 0.00
10% Food Subsidy 0.37% 0.42% 0.50 0.50 0.00
Notes: The optimal price index comprises food prices, sticky nonfood domestic goods
prices, and import prices. Welfare gains under different parameter values are derived as
permanent consumption gains relative to strict core inflation targeting.
would be difficult for governments in emerging market economies to implement,
a tax or subsidy on food is feasible.
Consider a food tax, whose revenues are distributed across all households in
a lump sum fashion. This tax would lead to a larger redistribution from food
sector households to other households when the economy is hit by a shock that
drives up the price of food. This would result in a smaller change in the relative
price of food compared to my baseline model. I conducted some numerical exper-
iments showing that, as the food tax increased (up to a certain level), the economy
approached the complete markets benchmark, with smaller gains from headline
inflation targeting relative to core inflation targeting.
I get the symmetric result that food price subsidies can increase relative price
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volatility and improve the benefits from headline rather than core inflation target-
ing. The reason is that these subsidies would result in a net transfer from nonfood
sector households to food sector households exactly when the relative price of
food rises. These results are summarized in Table B.3.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
This appendix lists the complete system of equations that characterizes the
competitive equilibrium under the baseline model, which consists of 28 endoge-
nous variables {cTt , cNt , ct, b∗t , wT,t, wN,t, LTt , LNt , Yt, YN,t, YH,t, Gt, Ft, νt, Rt, pit, xT,t, xN,t,
xF,t, xH,t, xt, qet , et, piN,t, AH,t, AN,t, S t, R∗t } and 28 equations.
C.1 Household Decisions
Tradable goods sector households’ budget constraints:
CTt + q
e
t b
∗
t +
ψb
2
b∗t
2
= R∗t−1q
e
t b
∗
t−1 + wT,tL
T
t (C.1)
Nontradable goods sector households’ budget constraints:
(1 − λ)CNt = xN,tYN,t (C.2)
Tradable goods sector households’ intertemporal Euler equation from domes-
tic bonds holding:
CTt
−σ
= βEt
(
Rt
pit+1
CTt+1
−σ
)
(C.3)
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Tradable goods sector households’ intertemporal Euler equation from foreign
bonds holding:
CTt
−σ
= βEt
(
R∗t
(1 + ψbb∗t )
qet+1
qet
CTt+1
−σ
)
(C.4)
Tradable goods sector households’ optimal labor supply decision:
wT,t = φTCTt
σLTt
ψ (C.5)
Nontradable goods sector households’ optimal labor supply decision:
wN,t = φNCNt
σLNt
ψ (C.6)
C.2 Firm Production
Cost minimization for firms in the tradable goods sector:
wT,t = xH,tAH,t (C.7)
Output in the tradable goods sector is given by:
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YH,t = λAH,tLTt (C.8)
Optimal price-setting in the sticky price sector is given by:
1 − θpiε−1N,t1 − θ

1
1−ε
=
Gt
Ft
(C.9)
The recursive formulation of the numerator Gt:
Gt =
ε
ε − 1C
N
t
−σYN,t
wN,t
AN,t
+ βθEtpiεN,t+1Gt+1 (C.10)
The recursive formulation of the denominator Ft:
Ft = xn,tCNt
−σYN,t + βθEtpiε−1N,t+1Ft+1 (C.11)
The dynamics of price dispersion is given by:
νt = (1 − θ)
(
1 − θpiN,tε−1
1 − θ
) ε
ε−1
+ θpiN,t
ενt−1 (C.12)
Output in the nontradable goods sector is:
νtYN,t = (1 − λ)AN,tLNt (C.13)
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C.3 Aggregate Economy
The definition of aggregate consumption is given by:
Ct = λCTt + (1 − λ)CNt (C.14)
The definition of aggregate output is given by:
Yt = xH,tYH,t + xN,tYN,t (C.15)
The market clearing condition for nontradable goods is given by:
(1 − b)x−ξN,tCt = YN,t (C.16)
C.4 Price, Inflation and Monetary Policy
Nontradable goods price index and relative prices:
xN,t = xN,t−1
piN,t
pit
(C.17)
Home-produced tradable goods price dynamics:
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xH,t = xH,t−1
qet
qet−1
st
st−1
(C.18)
Foreign-produced tradable goods price dynamics:
xF,t = xF,t−1
qet
qet−1
(C.19)
Price index in the Tradable goods sector is given by:
xT,t = xF,t
[
as1−ηt + (1 − a)
] 1
1−η (C.20)
Aggregate price index and relative prices:
1 =
[
bx1−ξT,t + (1 − b)x1−ξN,t
] 1
1−ξ (C.21)
The definition of the relative price:
xt =
xN,t
xH,t
(C.22)
The definition of the real exchange rate:
qet
qet−1
=
et
et−1pit
(C.23)
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Monetary policy rule (baseline model):
log
(Rt
R¯
)
= ρ log
(Rt−1
R¯
)
+ (1 − ρ)
[
φpilog
(
pit
p¯i
)
+ φelog
(
et
et−1
)]
(C.24)
C.5 Shocks
Productivity shock in the tradable goods sector:
log
(
AH,t
AH
)
= ρHa log
(
AH,t−1
AH
)
+ εHt (C.25)
Productivity shock in the nontradable goods sector:
log
(
AN,t
AN
)
= ρNa log
(
AN,t−1
AN
)
+ εNt (C.26)
Terms of trade shock in the tradable goods sector:
log
(
S t
S
)
= ρslog
(
S t−1
S
)
+ εσt (C.27)
Foreign interest shock:
log
(
R∗t
R
∗
)
= ρrlog
(
R∗t−1
R
∗
)
+ εrt (C.28)
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